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Letter from the Editor 
 After another challenging yet enriching cycle, it is with 
tremendous excitement that, on behalf  of  the Editorial Board, I 
present the newest edition of  the Penn History Review.
 As I conclude my term as Editor-in-Chief  of  the Penn 
History Review, I cannot help but reflect upon my time with great 
fondness. I first joined the Editorial Board in the spring of  
2014. Since then, I have read many submissions, collaborated 
with numerous editors, and edited undergraduate history papers 
that range from the elegant to the provocative. The amount of  
knowledge I have gained about history, the publication process, 
and ultimately, about myself, has been invaluable. Without a 
doubt, the reason why my tenure on the Editorial Board has been 
so positive rests upon the core tenet of  the Penn History Review: 
publishing the finest original and scholarly history essays. In 
doing so, one can share the perspective of  an author’s academic 
passion, and, more specifically, for focused and well-researched 
topics. This issue of  the Penn History Review is no exception. 
 The first article in this issue is The Age of  Infrastructure: 
The Triumph and Tragedy of  the Progressive Civil Religion, by Joseph 
Kiernan. This piece highlights the political career of  Senator 
George W. Norris of  Nebraska, who was considered a leader 
of  the progressive civil religion in the United States during the 
mid-twentieth century. While the author provides a synopsis of  
Norris’ entire political career, the paper focuses on the zenith of  
Senator Norris’ work, highlighting the admirable and determined 
spirit with which he championed the inception of  the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. Consequently, the reader will appreciate the 
titanic amount of  “red tape” Norris grappled with to achieve 
his vision for the United States, and how the Nebraskan Senator 
carved a legacy for himself  in the country, both literally and 
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figuratively.
 Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation: Implications 
of  Using Public Schools to House the Polio Vaccine Field Trial of  1954, 
written by Will Schupmann, is the second article included in 
this issue. This work highlights the controversy surrounding 
the mass field trial overseen by the National Foundation for 
Infantile Paralysis (NFIP) for young school children in an effort 
to combat the life-threatening disease, poliomyelitis (polio). 
Specifically, the NFIP opted to administer Jonas Salk’s new and 
promising vaccine for polio in public schools, yet this decision, 
in conjunction with other choices by the NFIP, had an important 
impact regarding how the public perceived the field trial. Thus, 
the reader will be surprised to learn how and why the NFIP was 
successful in implementing its widespread inoculation program 
and, more broadly, about the implications of  hosting a mass field 
trial in public schools.  
 The third paper is entitled The Emerging Storm: Sir Percy 
Loraine and Anglo-Turkish Rapprochement, 1934-1935, by Otto 
Kienitz. The paper begins by introducing Sir Percy Loraine, 
who in 1934 became Britain’s new Ambassador to the Republic 
of  Turkey. After examining the geopolitical landscape of  the 
interwar era, the author describes the diplomatic, economic, and 
security challenges faced by Loraine in the British Ambassador’s 
attempt to recommence a mutually steadfast and respectful 
relationship between Britain and Turkey. By revealing the 
private conversations and meetings between Loraine and various 
Turkish officials to the reader, the author not only underscores 
the strenuous and lethargic process of  this diplomacy in general, 
but also emphasizes the success, impact, and significance of  
Loraine’s ambassadorial endeavors in particular.
 The final scholarly essay featured is “Indianizing the 
Confederacy”: Understandings of  War Cruelty During the American Civil 
War and the Sioux Uprising of  1862, written by Zachary Brown 
of  Stanford University. After defining the characteristics of  
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the phenomenon known as “Indian war,” this paper explores 
how the northern press pinned these negative traits to their 
adversaries in the South and the Minnesota Frontier during the 
early- to mid-1860s. Although the northern media’s decision 
seemed to transpire as a consequence of  extreme and often 
hyperbolized instances, these accusations persuaded and unified a 
horrified and appalled audience. Ultimately, therefore, the reader 
will grasp the power and impact of  the northern press during 
this tumultuous and sanguinary era, especially regarding how 
propaganda connected and influenced the Union’s perception 
of  its enemy combatants.
 Publishing a scholarly journal requires a team effort, thus 
the Editorial Board would also like to extend its sincere thanks to 
Dr. Siyen Fei, Undergraduate Chair of  the History Department, 
and to Dr. Yvonne Fabella, the Undergraduate Advisor of  
the History Department. Their advice, encouragement, and 
promotion of  the Penn History Review demonstrates the support 
and commitment of  the History Department in publishing 
outstanding original and scholarly work written by undergraduate 
students. Also, the Editorial Board would like to express its 
gratitude for both the faculty of  the University of  Pennsylvania 
and at other schools across the United States who advertised 
this publication to students, as well as to the students who 
submitted work for consideration. Finally, the Editorial Board 
wishes a heartfelt thank you to the University of  Pennsylvania 
for providing a platform to augment and to enhance the field of  
history with unique academic texts.
 On a more personal note, I would like to thank the 
members of  the Editorial Board for their efforts, enthusiasm, 
and dedication to publishing this issue of  the Penn History Review. 
In particular, it is with great pleasure to have added three new 
members to our Editorial Board—Isabel Gendler, Emma 
Hetrick, and Cristina Urquidi; they are assets to our team. Lastly, 
I want to offer my appreciation to my friends and family, whose 
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motivation and support has been immeasurable. 
 Congratulations to all of  the editors and authors who 
have contributed to this Fall 2016 Issue of  the Penn History Review!
 
Aaron C. Mandelbaum
Editor-in-Chief
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Propoganda Poster from the Second World War 
Celebrating the Force and Magnitude of  the Tennessee Valley Authority 
Ten Years After its Inception
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The Age of Infrastructure:
The Triumph and Tragedy of the 
Progressive Civil Religion
Joseph Kiernan
“And what is faith? It is not born solely or largely by the actions 
of  one but through the contributions of  millions living in the 
spirit of  justice, with due consideration for the burdens and 
rights of  all others.” 
– Senator George W. Norris (R-NE)1
INTRODUCTION
 During the 1930s, simmering progressivism erupted 
into furious activity, initiating the Age of  Infrastructure in the 
United States of  America (U.S.). After decades of  piecemeal 
development of  roads and railways at the hands of  states and 
private corporations, Washington, D.C. took command. Gone 
were the railroad cabals of  Charles Crocker, James J. Hill, Mark 
Hopkins, Collis Huntington, Leland Stanford, and Cornelius 
Vanderbilt. Now, economic crisis and rural poverty had galvanized 
unprecedented popular support for government intervention. 
Under the guidance of  ideological heavyweights, the federal 
government seized the reins of  infrastructure development 
in the United States, fusing decades of  stewing resentment of  
corporate greed with a New Deal checkbook. Commissions, 
rather than corporations, laid asphalt, hung wire, bridged valleys, 
and dammed rivers. It was an era in which men of  a singular, 
unstoppable vision—David Lilienthal, George W. Norris, and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt—acquired the means to substantiate their 
dreams.
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 Thus, this is the story of  Senator George W. Norris, a 
Republican from Nebraska, who fought to expand government 
to an unprecedented level in his crusade against poverty and 
injustice. The bane of  the imperious Speaker Joseph Cannon 
(R-IL), Norris took on distinguished industrialist Henry Ford 
and won. Norris also challenged his own political party with his 
unyielding beliefs, leaving a legacy of  concrete and light.
 In his devotion to the progressive cause, Norris earned 
no shortage of  foes. Consequently, this is also the story of  his 
opponent, a Democrat-turned-Republican named Wendell 
Willkie of  Indiana, who fought Norris and the Senator’s creation, 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), in an effort to protect 
free enterprise from government coercion. Willkie, armed with 
a passion that earned him national notoriety and widespread 
respect, sought to check the excesses of  the “progressive civil 
religion of  infrastructure” when its adherents, empowered by 
the government, began to infringe on the fundamental values of  
freedom. The TVA survives as an enduring symbol of  the New 
Deal, but its roots reached deeper than the Executive Branch’s 
campaign against the blight of  the Great Depression (1929-
1939).
 The progressive civil religion did not emerge ex nihilo in 
the tempestuous first hundred days of  the New Deal. Its origins 
were older, growing in the Great Plains among disaffected farmers 
and in the parlors of  Boston’s Brahmins. Its adherents ranged 
from the Protestant Nebraskans who sent George W. Norris to 
Congress for almost forty years, even when he committed the 
most egregious of  political heresies, to the social reforming elite 
of  Manhattan, who handed a young, brilliant civil servant named 
Robert Moses the power to reshape their world. The progressive 
civil religion took many shapes such as, inter alia, the campaigns 
of  trustbusters and yellow journalists to curb corporate power, 
the conservationism of  Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford 
Pinchot, and Social Security. However, in doing so, the New Deal 
empowered a unique strain of  the ecumenical progressive civil 
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religion: a progressive crusade for infrastructure. This was the 
faith of  Norris, mixing agrarian nationalism, progressivism, and 
populism with a deep distrust of  capitalism and an unrelenting 
confidence in the altruistic potential of  government.2  This radical 
denomination, the constant frustration of  internationalists and 
free marketers, was built on a core belief  that the government’s 
role was not only to moderate and to regulate the excesses of  
American capitalists, but also to serve as the egalitarian vanguard 
of  a better, fairer society.
 In the pursuit of  its agenda, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s administration handed the instruments of  state to 
men such as Norris to build infrastructure for the American 
people and to engineer a new society. When unchecked, the 
progressive civil religion led down a dark road to paternalism and 
arrogant trampling of  core American economic freedoms. At its 
worst, the progressive civil religion of  infrastructure was a self-
righteous crusade for a moral, just society that denigrated the 
folly of  individualism and the American belief  in productive self-
advancement. However, when moderated by legitimate criticism 
and motivated by unflagging commitment to the national need, 
this liberal creed could master the natural power of  the United 
States for the common good, and uplift millions to the American 
Dream. Its prophets seized upon a unique moment in American 
history, carving the physical scripture of  this populist faith into 
the land for posterity.
THE ROAD TO MUSCLE SHOALS
 The series of  events that led to the birth of  the TVA 
began far across the Pacific Ocean in the tense summer months 
of  1914. The spiraling diplomatic crisis in Europe spurred 
tensions that reverberated throughout the Kaiser’s Pacific 
possessions. As war threatened to break out across Europe, 
German Vice-Admiral Maximillian Reichsgraf  von Spee, on tour 
with the battleships SMS Scharnhorst and SMS Gneisenau en route 
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to Truk in Micronesia, contemplated the options for his fleet, 
the German East Asian Cruiser Squadron. Should the pressures 
of  the summer erupt into armed conflict, Germany would have 
limited naval resources abroad to defend its Pacific possessions.
 The Triple Entente Powers, especially Britain and her 
bilateral ally Japan, had relative naval superiority in the Asian 
Pacific Rim. Ultimately, when the July Crisis degraded into the 
inception of  the First World War (1914-1918) in August, Spee 
opted to sail towards South America, seeking neutral colliers 
and plotting a path back towards the Fatherland. British and 
American naval strategists eyed Spee’s voyage with concern as 
the Germans cruised toward Cape Horn, Chile. Although the 
East Asian flotilla faced defeat at the hands of  the British Royal 
Navy off  the Falkland Islands, the German escapades in the 
Pacific, combined with the privateering cruiser SMS Emden’s 
activities near British India, unnerved the Triple Entente Powers. 
 The German naval presence off  the Chilean coast raised 
concerns in the United States, a neutral but nervous power.3 At 
the time, Chile was the major exporter of  nitrates to the U.S., 
critical for producing fertilizers and explosives, both resources 
of  profound strategic importance. In the arid northern reaches 
of  the long littoral country, huge nitrate deposits at Antofagasta 
and Tarapacá attracted foreign firms from Britain, Germany, 
and the United States to harvest this vital ingredient for modern 
agriculture and weaponry.4
 With the advent of  hostilities, the Germans, now cut off  
from global trade by the British blockade, developed nitrogen 
fixation methods (the Haber process) to produce sufficient 
materiel domestically. The German innovations and German 
investments in hydroelectric energy to power the nitrate 
production ensured a steady supply of  shells for Krupp guns in 
northern France. They also helped feed the hungry Reich, where 
the agricultural output per acre outpaced most peer countries.5 
The United States, however, had no reserve supply of  nitrates, 
was still reliant on Chilean imports.6 In a time of  global war and 
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commerce raiding, the sea lines of  communication to Tarapacá 
seemed more vulnerable than ever.
 As the specter of  armed conflict loomed, American 
military planners fretted over the nitrate problem. On December 
27, 1915, Brigadier General Crozier, the U.S. Army Chief  of  
Ordnance, called for the development of  air-made nitrate 
production in the United States. With the potential for U.S. 
involvement rising, the United States’ dependency on Chile for 
critical munitions became a political issue. German privateering 
and heightened submarine warfare in the North Atlantic Ocean 
demonstrated how hostile maritime activity could interdict trade, 
potentially debilitating American military preparedness.7
 On June 3, 1916, in response to the mounting likelihood 
of  war, President Woodrow Wilson signed the National Defense 
Act (NDA), a comprehensive bill to reorganize and modernize 
the armed forces of  the United States.8 The nitrate issue was 
a component of  the broad legislative initiative. Under pressure 
from Muscle Shoals, Alabama, where business interests and 
impoverished southerners backed the construction of  a dam 
and a nitrate plant along the Tennessee River, Senator Oscar 
Underwood (D-AL) fought to include Section 124 in the NDA, 
the “Nitrate Supply.” Section 124 “empowered” the President to 
“determine the best, cheapest, and most available means for the 
production of  nitrates…upon any…river” and authorized the 
Executive “to construct, maintain, and operate…dams, locks, 
improvements to navigation, power houses…for the generation 
of  [electricity]” and “the production of  nitrates.”9 Muscle 
Shoals, positioned along the mighty Tennessee River, was an 
ideal location. The federally-run project would direct millions of  
federal dollars into the needy region and jumpstart an industrial 
awakening in a significant portion of  the sleepy South.
 In the early twentieth century, the Tennessee Valley had not 
shared in the economic prosperity brought by industrialization. 
The region, following the river from its sources in western 
Virginia and North Carolina, snaked from the highlands of  East 
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Tennessee past Knoxville and Chattanooga down into northern 
Alabama and Mississippi before turning northward back through 
West Tennessee to join the Ohio River near Paducah, Kentucky. 
Unlike the rich metallurgical mecca of  the upper Ohio River and 
the Great Lakes region, the Tennessee Valley was dependent on 
a faltering agricultural base. From the late nineteenth century 
to the 1920s and 1930s, the size of  farms diminished and the 
number of  tenant farmers tripled as population growth and 
productivity stagnated.10 Thus, for socioeconomic as well as 
military reasons, Muscle Shoals seemed an ideal location for the 
Section 124 nitrate plant and accompanying hydroelectric dam. 
 When word of  the site’s selection reached northern 
Alabama, thousands flocked to the Muscle Shoals/Florence 
area, looking for work.11 Frantic construction on the dam and 
nitrate plant proceeded as demand for fertilizer and munitions 
skyrocketed with the deployment of  American forces to the 
Western Front in Belgium and France. However, the end of  
the war and the return to normalcy ushered in congressional 
attempts to rein in wartime spending, including cutting the Muscle 
Shoals initiative. By March 1920, fiscal conservatives sank an 
appropriations package to continue work on the project, stalling 
construction indefinitely.12 The partially-completed facility would 
remain dormant while national business and political forces 
battled to see who would control the fate of  Muscle Shoals and 
the Tennessee Valley’s development. On one side, the greatest 
industrialist of  the country would seek to build a new Detroit on 
the Tennessee River. On the other, a mustachioed lawyer from 
McCook, Nebraska, would seek to stop him.
THE PROPHET FROM NEBRASKA
 They called him a “son of  the wild jackass,” a “radical,” a 
socialist, and a scourge sent to Washington, D.C. for Nebraska’s 
political schadenfreude.13 They also called him the “Fighting 
Liberal,” the “pillar of  the New Deal,” and “an uncompromising 
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foe of  special privilege.”14 Future President John F. Kennedy 
eulogized him in Profiles in Courage (1955). Businessmen damned 
his liberal tendencies. Presidents of  his own political party vetoed 
his bills and presidents of  the other political party supported 
his reelection. The people of  Nebraska chose him to represent 
them for forty years. To his admirers, he represented them 
and Americans everywhere, and he fought with an unbridled 
intensity to defend their democratic rights, to afford them 
economic opportunity, and to uplift them out of  poverty.15 For 
his defiance, his leadership, and his uncompromising empathy, 
George W. Norris is remembered as one of  the greatest populist 
senators in American history. 
George W. Norris, 
Senator from Nebraska and 
Leader of  the Progressive Civil Religion
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 He was also the legislative champion of  a faith, the 
progressive civil religion of  infrastructure. Acquainted with 
the trials of  farmers scratching a living out of  the Nebraska 
prairie and the ruinous consequences of  capitalist speculation, 
Norris maintained a deep compassion for the rural poor and a 
loathing for the capitalist industrialists. His devotion to populist 
progressivism bordered on zealotry. On politics and religion, 
Norris once wrote, “True love for humanity is an unselfish 
desire to perpetuate the welfare and happiness of  all the people 
comprising the government. I think religion is the same thing.”16 
He would attack economic problems with ideological ferocity 
throughout his long career on the national stage.
 Nebraskans elected Norris to the U.S. House of  
Representatives in 1902.17 At first, Norris played a quiet role 
in Congress, serving as a dutiful Republican. However, after 
five years in the House, his indignation towards the dictatorial 
management style of  Speaker Joseph Cannon grew and so 
did his penchant for legislative rebellion. In his autobiography, 
Fighting Liberal (1945), Norris reflected, “I doubt if  any Speaker 
in the history of  Congress was as ruthless as Joe Cannon was.”18 
Norris, therefore, decided that it was time to curtail the Speaker’s 
power. In May 1908, he challenged Cannon over the Ballinger-
Pinchot controversy, diving into a pool of  scandal that rocked 
the nation. 
 Specifically, Gifford Pinchot, a favorite of  conservationist 
progressives and hand-picked by President Theodore Roosevelt 
as the Chief  of  the U.S. Forest Service, came into conflict with 
President William Howard Taft’s Secretary of  the Interior, 
Richard Ballinger. Before leaving office, Roosevelt had announced 
that waterpower was for the “public interest” and directed 
Pinchot to reserve federal lands for hydroelectric purposes.19 
However, this led to a series of  escalating, and highly public, 
rhetorical brawls between Pinchot and Ballinger once the new 
Taft administration had settled in. When this conflict began to 
divide Congress, Cannon backed Ballinger and the White House, 
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who thought that Pinchot’s efforts were a conservationist bridge 
too far.20 Conversely, Norris backed the hardline progressive 
Pinchot. Eventually, Taft sacked Pinchot in January 1910, but 
Norris had led an effective revolt against the Speaker by aligning 
the progressives as a united front. The Ballinger-Pinchot 
controversy widened the divisions between the progressives, led 
by Theodore Roosevelt, and the conservatives, generally aligned 
with Taft. Furthermore, the controversy helped to break the 
back of  Cannon’s stranglehold on the House, giving Norris a 
starring role as an insurgent progressive who was willing and able 
to challenge the powers of  his own political party to advance his 
agenda and defend his values. In hindsight, this would not be the 
last time that hydropower elicited Norris to revolt.
 After his successful transition to the U.S. Senate in the 
1912 elections, Norris decided, once again, to buck the GOP 
in support of  Pinchot. In Pennsylvania’s 1914 U.S. Senate race, 
Norris travelled to the state and campaigned for Pinchot against 
the sitting Republican, Senator Boies Penrose.21 Interviewed 
by The New York Times a few weeks before the election, Norris 
remarked, “As a Republican Senator I consider it a duty to my 
conscience, to decent citizenship, and populist government to 
oppose with all my power the re-election of  Penrose.”22 Although 
Pinchot failed to defeat Penrose, Norris returned to Washington, 
D.C. and began developing his position on natural resources. He 
became a vigorous supporter of  the Raker Act of  1913 to allow 
San Francisco to create a reservoir in the Hetch Hetchy Valley, 
and a spirited opponent of  the private corporations which 
sought to “protect” the Valley from reservoir development so 
they could inhibit public control.23
 Beyond the sphere of  progressive domestic policy, 
Norris achieved fame and infamy for his positions on the rising 
tensions with Germany. A first-term member of  the U.S. Senate, 
he garnered harsh criticism for his unyielding opposition to 
American involvement in the First World War. For example, 
he went on to vote against the declaration of  war in April 
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1914.24 Additionally, feeling that his ensuing actions incited his 
constituents, Norris proposed a special recall election in March 
1917 so the people could reassess their support for him after he 
torpedoed an armed ship bill in the Senate through a filibuster.25 
The state committee denied his request for a recall, sparing him 
the public’s wrath. Norris, despite negative prognostications from 
journalists and political pundits, fared well in the Republican 
primary the next year and secured a victory in the 1918 general 
election against Governor John H. Morehead.26
 Overall, Norris’ first term in the U.S. Senate was 
eventful. His ardor for progressive causes and occasional self-
righteousness were emblematic of  the maverick career he would 
continue for the next three decades. Senator Norris came to be 
a standard-bearer for a distinctly populist, radical progressive 
civil religion, a new national faith that placed great confidence in 
the government’s ability to solve the ills of  mankind. Historian 
William Leuchtenburg described the progressive belief  structure 
as relying on the “Hamiltonian concept of  positive government” 
where actions were judged by “results achieved” rather than 
“means employed.”27 Focusing on American foreign policy, 
Leuchtenburg linked progressivism to imperialism. Although he 
was certainly a hardline progressive, Norris was no imperialist. 
His international viewpoint evoked William Jennings Bryan 
rather than Theodore Roosevelt or Woodrow Wilson. 
 Norris’ introspective progressive civil religion 
foreshadowed the spirit of  the 1930s. For him, the United States 
could afford little of  the burdens of  colonial investment when 
its own citizens cried out for relief. During his career, he did 
not just advocate for progressivism—labor rights, agricultural 
aid, and more direct democracy—he lived a progressive life of  
action seeking to solve problems through political means. His 
eternal focus was on the promotion of  the national welfare, 
often through his preferred policy bailiwick of  agricultural 
and infrastructural policies. Cautious of  foreign entanglements 
and disconnected from the progressive elites of  the coasts, 
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Norris united a robust faith in domestic progressivism with 
agrarian populism. Although he had supported Wilson’s liberal 
domestic policies, Norris’ strident opposition to the First World 
War defined his dichotomous civil religion—staunch domestic 
progressivism and national introversion. Fundamentally, Norris 
sought the transformation of  the regulatory liberal state to an 
activist national government. He sought to turn pen strokes into 
shovel-ready projects. He felt that the government must do what 
private industry did not do—provide for the people. Norris’ 
determination was unwavering despite consistent political 
setbacks, partially the result of  his stubbornness. The Classical 
Liberal zeitgeist of  the 1920s ensured that he was Norris, the 
Republican renegade. The progressive revolution of  the 1930s, 
the New Deal, put him on the front lines to build what he 
believed in—the TVA.
FORD VERSUS NORRIS
 On July 8, 1921, George W. Norris’ campaign for the TVA 
began. With the federal funding drought stunting the Muscle 
Shoals project, auto magnate Henry Ford submitted a proposal 
to acquire the nitrate plant and dam system through a deal in 
which his company would operate the facility. This offer included 
a one hundred year “lease on the Wilson Dam, the No. 3 dam 
and electric installation, when complete.”28 For southerners, the 
Ford proposal appeared ideal. The project would be completed 
and Ford would industrialize the Tennessee Valley, supposedly 
bringing with him the high-paying manufacturing jobs that had 
provided for thousands of  families throughout the Midwest. 
Herbert Hoover, the Secretary of  Commerce in President Warren 
G. Harding’s administration, voiced his support and admitted 
that “whatever may be the result, Mr. Ford’s offer does prove 
what the public associations [of  the region] have contended, that 
the completion of  the project has a commercial value.”29 The 
offer, however, required congressional action for approval first.
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 As the nitrate plant fell within the purview of  agricultural 
management, the Ford deal bill, S.3420, was sent to the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry. Its chairman was 
Senator George W. Norris. The Ford offer and the Muscle 
Shoals issue became the subjects of  a lengthy series of  hearings 
in the Committee throughout 1922. The bill’s consideration was 
complicated by the presence of  competing business interests 
which sought to take Muscle Shoals for themselves. Furthermore, 
the ambiguous contractual language in the bill obfuscated 
its potential ramifications. This led to a series of  complicated 
discussions peppered with civil engineering technicalities. Norris, 
however, came prepared.
 The testimony from the committee hearings on the 
bill reveals the strong support from a number of  influential 
southerners for the proposed deal, especially the Alabama 
delegation. It also illustrates Norris’ position on the appropriate 
role for private corporations and moneyed interests in the 
production of  nitrates and, more importantly, electricity.30 
Hearings began on February 16, 1922, when a delegation from 
Tennessee led by Governor Alf  Taylor arrived to testify. Taylor, 
highly supportive of  the Ford offer, commenced his address to 
the Committee with the following statement, in which he cited 
renown inventor Thomas Edison:
[Edison] said in my presence that it was impossible to 
conceive the immensity of  the power that could be 
produced by that plant when completed, and that the 
benefits to be derived to the country at large were also 
inconceivable, and that Henry Ford was the man to take 
hold and operate it when it was completed, because he was 
an honest man, and a man of  splendid judgment, and a 
man who had succeeded, and a man who had the money.31 
Curiously, Taylor’s speech continued with a broad appeal against 
sectionalism and particularism. Perhaps aware of  the geographic 
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diversity of  the sixteen committee members and knowing that 
the economic benefit of  the development would be concentrated 
in the northern Alabama area, only relevant to Senators Pat 
Harrison (D-MS) and J. Thomas Heflin (D-AL), Taylor adopted 
a nationwide tone, remarking that “what is good for one section 
of  this Union is good for every section.”32 The memories of  the 
Civil War were still fresh in the minds of  many. Taylor understood 
that to promote regional infrastructural development, a national 
justification had to be made. When Norris attempted to advance 
his own legislation, he would take this lesson to heart. 
 Later that day, the Committee heard from Robert 
Campbell, a business organizer from Johnson City, Tennessee. 
Attempting to elucidate the motivation for Ford’s interest in 
the project and the bill’s ambiguous language concerning the 
requirement to actually produce nitrates, the Committee pressed 
Mr. Campbell on what he considered to be the industrialist’s 
intentions. Campbell, scrambling for answers, stated, “Mr. Ford’s 
ambitions can not [sic] any longer demand money. He must 
want to…build a monument.”33 Unsatisfied, the Committee 
members asked Campbell whether, under the proposed statute, 
Ford would be barred from transitioning to a more profitable 
industry as profits from fertilizer production were capped at eight 
percent. Campbell responded, “I trust Mr. Ford…You have to 
trust somebody.”34 Senator John W. Harreld (R-OK), suspicious 
of  Ford’s motives, noted that the project was not “altruism.”35 
Norris, who in June of  the previous year had proposed the 
creation of  a “Federal Farmer’s Export Financing Corporation” 
to buy crops from farmers for international resale, agreed with 
Harreld’s sentiments.36 It would later become clear that in those 
cases where a key national interest was concerned, Norris would 
prefer to inject altruism through the government rather than 
entrusting a private citizen, such as Henry Ford, to do so instead.
 After a brief  hiatus, the hearings resumed on April 10, 
1922. Once again, the witness, this time Senator Underwood 
from Alabama, argued that Ford was pursuing the deal for 
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altruistic reasons. Underwood, who had a clear and compelling 
interest in facilitating the industrialization of  the Muscle Shoals 
area through Ford’s proposal, opined with saccharine hyperbole. 
After lambasting opponents of  the deal, Underwood orated that 
“[Ford] is prepared to do a great patriotic act for the people 
of  the United States by limiting the amount of  his profits and 
producing fertilizer for them as cheaply as possible.”37
 When the President of  the Alabama Power Company, 
Thomas W. Martin, came to testify on April 11 and April 18, 
Chairman Norris asked why Alabama power customers faced 
such high prices and massive discrepancies in kilowatt prices.38 
Norris noted that “there is something wrong if  [Alabama 
municipalities] pay you for their electricity less than a cent and 
sell it to their people for 12 cents.”39 Martin provided a series of  
evasive answers, to which Norris provided the counterexample 
of  the low prices enjoyed by electricity customers in Ontario, 
Canada, where the government ran the power system.40 Ontario 
Hydro, which relied on extensive hydroelectric installations 
along the Niagara River, would become a model for Norris as he 
conducted independent research on the viability of  a government-
run power generation and distribution corporation.41 
 By May 1, Norris’ patience for Fordists and corporate 
envoys was wearing thin. William B. Mayo, Chief  Engineer of  the 
Ford Motor Company, arrived to testify before the Committee. 
Norris, unsatisfied with the ambiguity of  answers on Ford’s 
ultimate intentions for the plant and dams, was concerned that 
the industrialist would exploit the contract’s loopholes to dupe 
the government.42 After an endless series of  inane prevarications 
from Mayo, Norris’ tolerance expired and he interjected, “I have 
been wondering, Mr. Mayo, why is it that, representing Mr. Ford, 
you are not willing to take the committee and the Congress into 
your full confidence and let them know just exactly what you 
expect to do with this power if  you get it.”43 Norris continued 
with his critical rhetoric against private, corporate infrastructure 
improvements.44 The ongoing testimonials failed to allay his 
Penn History Review     25 
The Age of Infrastructure
fears that once Henry Ford died, the company would repurpose 
the nitrate facility. Questioning the chairman of  the Tennessee 
River Improvement Association Executive Committee, J.W. 
Worthington, Norris expressed his irritation that businessmen 
expected the government to grant Ford a carte blanche and trust 
that his motives aligned with the public interest. Norris remarked, 
“But [Ford] is not the only man in the country that is good, 
although he may be one of  the best of  them.”45
 Considering Muscle Shoals a matter of  national 
importance, Norris sparred with Worthington, alleging that 
it was the government’s role to protect the people from Ford. 
Worthington shot back at the Chairman, quipping, “The people 
of  this country don’t want to be saved.”46 With that incendiary 
remark, Worthington touched upon a major component of  
Norris’ progressive American civil religion. Norris believed that 
the people needed protection from the profit-driven capitalist 
class, including Henry Ford, who would use any opportunity to 
price, gouge, profiteer, or pilfer. To that end, Norris maintained 
a conviction that it was the government’s role to intervene or 
preempt to safeguard the public welfare. Conservatives would 
probably have agreed with Worthington, portraying Norris as 
self-righteous. But the exchange with Worthington revealed 
the Nebraska Senator’s faith that Norris knew what the people 
needed even if  they did not, for he knew how to protect them 
from the dangers of  antidemocratic capitalist elites, and he 
knew that government must be the shield. These convictions 
undergirded Norris’ political philosophy.
 A New York Times article from May 10, 1922, captured 
Norris’ opposition to the Ford deal. Norris remarked that he 
would permit “no corporation” to take over the Muscle Shoals 
properties and felt that the bill included an “unconscionable 
contract.”47 Agreeing with a statement from the Merchant’s 
Association on a prior Ford offer to the Secretary of  War, Norris 
believed that a deal with a corporation on Muscle Shoals would 
represent a major loss for the government.48 Four days earlier on 
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May 6, Norris once again lost his temper in an interaction with 
a business representative from the Air Nitrates Corporation. 
Expressing similar sentiments to his comments in April, Norris 
remarked:
You haven’t any assurance that this corporation will 
benefit the people one iota, and you cannot demonstrate 
it or show it, and that is where the curse comes in. It 
will be just like any other corporation. It will be owned 
by somebody else and will be manipulated just the same 
as the International Harvester Co. has been manipulated 
and is being manipulated right now, and the farmer will 
not be helped any.49 
 With a keen interest in the benefits of  hydropower 
and cheap fertilizer for American farmers, Norris saw Muscle 
Shoals as an opportunity to replenish the ruined soils of  the 
impoverished Tennessee Valley and to give the people access to 
affordable electricity. Residents and business interests in the region 
were eager for the government to complete the dam project for 
energy generation and navigation purposes. However, the cagy 
testimony of  the parade of  corporate officials and the weakness 
of  the government position in S.3420 convinced Norris that it 
must be Washington, D.C., not Wall Street, to assume leadership 
at Muscle Shoals. Therefore, Norris launched his own effort, 
proposing a government-controlled corporation.
 Throughout the hearings, Norris blamed pro-Ford 
propaganda for the strong public support for the bill’s passage. 
Norris’ opposition to the Ford proposal earned him many 
enemies throughout the South, where he was burned in effigy 
for halting development along the Tennessee River.50 Senators 
Charles McNary (R-OR) and Norris clashed with their 
Democratic colleagues, Alabamians Heflin and Underwood, in 
a continuous war of  words.51 The tensions did not abate during 
the following years. Heflin called Norris’ 1924 Muscle Shoals 
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 bill “Bolshevistic.”52 Residents of  the region were furious with 
Norris. However, the Teapot Dome Scandal galvanized public 
outrage at the apparent collusion of  government and private 
companies to ravage national natural resources.53 On July 15, 
1922, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry rejected 
the Ford proposal by a vote of  nine to seven.54 The Committee 
also halted Norris’ government-controlled proposal by a vote of  
nine to five.55 Both proposals later went to the Senate floor as 
minority reports.
 Throughout the entirety of  the Muscle Shoals debate, 
Norris couched his arguments and opinions in his progressive 
civil religious attitude. Once, he remarked that government was 
a “religion that does not consider the conditions which exist 
beyond the grave but confines its consideration to happiness in 
this life.”56 For Norris, the problem with corporate leadership 
in matters of  national interest returned to the initial point 
established by Senator Harreld: altruism. The Nebraskan 
Senator held a deep suspicion of  business motives, as shown by 
his intense interrogation of  corporate witnesses, and believed, 
rightfully or not, that any “damn corporation” would exploit the 
government and the people in the pursuit of  profit, regardless of  
the consequences.57
 After the hearings and aware of  the economic situation 
facing the region, Norris envisioned a vanguard role for the 
government in the Tennessee Valley. The 1920s would be marked 
by his repeated attempts to push his legislative proposals, the 
forerunners to the TVA, through Congress and into law. Always 
a renegade, Norris would take on the succession of  presidents 
of  his own political party to realize this vision.
THE REPUBLICAN REBEL
 In June 1925, George F. Milton, a reporter for The 
Independent, described the Tennessee Valley as “the Ruhr of  
America,” an allusion to the heartland of  German industrial 
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strength. However, unlike its German counterpart, the Tennessee 
Valley languished in poverty and underdevelopment. Also, unlike 
the Ruhr, the Tennessee Valley, which Milton projected to be 
“the very heart of  industrial America,” still had not resolved the 
political impediments to its economic salvation. The Wilson Dam 
in Muscle Shoals was completed that year, but the hydroelectric, 
fertilizer, and progressive (Norris) interests had opposing views 
on what to do with its electricity.58 As Milton attests, the people 
understood that “the Tennessee River is rightly a national 
institution,” and Norris thought that national institutions should 
be controlled by their owners, the citizens of  the United States.59
 Throughout the 1920s, Norris waged a successful 
legislative war of  attrition against conservative adversaries to gain 
public control of  Muscle Shoals. Not only did Norris fight for a 
comprehensive, government-led effort, but he also campaigned 
to derail Senator Underwood’s attempts to pass legislation 
that merely focused on fertilizer production. Furthermore, in 
December 1924, Norris denounced President Calvin Coolidge’s 
alleged attempt to cede Muscle Shoals to the “water power trust.” 
He argued that the President’s intent was to deliver to Wall Street 
“a concession so great that it will make Teapot Dome [Scandal] 
look like a pinhead.”60 In doing so though, Norris’ attacks 
spawned strange political bedfellows as Underwood the Southern 
Democrat allied with Coolidge the Massachusetts Republican 
against Norris the progressive Nebraska Republican.61 For 
Norris, party loyalty meant nothing compared to the national 
imperative of  economic development at Muscle Shoals. Also, 
to Coolidge’s chagrin, Norris had backed independent Robert 
“Fighting Bob” La Follette Sr. over Coolidge in the presidential 
election of  1924, which surely did not endear the Senator to the 
new President.62 Underwood subsequently defended Coolidge 
and branded Norris as a “Populist” demagogue.63 Although they 
were defeated, Coolidge and Underwood would exact vengeance 
when Norris’ own proposals reached the Senate floor soon 
afterward.
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 Norris introduced a proto-TVA bill, S.J. Res. 2147, in 
January 1926, but it died in committee. However, in December 
1927, Norris’ succeeding bill, S.J. Res. 46 or the “Morin-Norris 
resolution,” which provided “for the completion of  Dam. No. 
2 at Muscle Shoals and the steam plant at Nitrate Plant No. 2,” 
was passed by Congress. In a scathing attack, The Washington Post 
labeled the Morin-Norris bill as “communism, pure and simple” 
and “essentially un-American.”64 Unsurprisingly, Coolidge 
exercised a pocket veto to kill the legislation in June 1928.65 In 
response, Norris launched a furious assault against Coolidge, 
threatening to break up the Republican Party and organize a 
third-party Farmer-Progressive ticket to challenge the Republican 
establishment in the year’s general election.66 This proved the 
depth of  Norris’ devotion to pro-farmer, progressive policies. 
Not only did he animadvert the President as a stooge of  the 
“power trust,” but he also discussed a full-scale rebellion against 
his own political party’s administration and the party leadership 
itself. Were Norris a marginalized radical, these actions may have 
seemed less unusual. However, he enjoyed respect and legislative 
support throughout Congress, which made his defiance all the 
more exceptional. For Norris, the call of  his civil faith was too 
strong to bow to Coolidge, or to any non-progressive president.
 In 1928, Norris broke party ranks again and endorsed 
New York Democratic Governor Al Smith for the presidency.67 
Although Smith’s “wet,” Catholic background proved unpopular 
with Nebraskans, Norris believed that the Governor’s 
compassion for the common people warranted his support over 
the free marketeering Republican challenger, Secretary Herbert 
Hoover. However, Hoover’s victory ensured another unfriendly 
conservative White House for Norris. With the new president 
assuming office in May 1929 though, Norris tried to gain support 
for his government-control effort again with a new legislative 
bill, S.J. Res. 49. Indeed, the people of  the Tennessee Valley 
had grown tired of  the government’s vacillation on the Muscle 
Shoals project. As Congress turned the dam and nitrate system 
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into a political football, the farmers and businessmen of  the 
region wished for some form of  action. Even the “communist” 
government-operated proposal floated by Norris, therefore, was 
gaining traction. 
 Reporting on the situation in the Deep South from 
Florence, Alabama, journalist Anne O’Hare McCormick wrote, 
“Inoculation against the idea of  ‘government in business’ goes 
far and deep, particularly in regions like [the Tennessee Valley], 
where government does not fulfill even the humblest citizen’s 
ideal of  efficiency or honesty.”68 As the woe of  the Great 
Depression deepened, the people of  the Tennessee Valley looked 
to Washington, D.C. for a “second reconstruction.” Recording 
the local reaction to the new legislation, McCormick observed, 
“A few days after the second passage of  the Norris resolution 
declaring that Muscle Shoals shall be owned and operated by 
the government, the valley is once more stirred by the hope 
of  action as by a fresh wind from the north.”69 With broad 
legislative support, Norris’ bill passed Congress and headed 
down Pennsylvania Avenue to Hoover’s desk.70
 Like his Republican predecessor, President Hoover, 
standing adamant against federal control, vetoed the bill. The 
President commented that opposition to Norris’ agenda 
“appears to be cause for denunciation as being in league with 
the power companies.”71 A few days prior, Norris had alleged 
that the power trust sought to manipulate the U.S. government 
and appropriate her resources, hinting that Hoover was caught 
in its corporate enchantment. Lambasting the utilities, Norris 
stated, “What is the raw material of  this monopoly? It is the 
rivers and the brooks that flow from the mountains to the sea. 
Is it not true that the people own these natural resources?”72 
Not only did Norris believe that the power trust exerted undue 
monopolistic influence, but he also felt that it could coerce the 
media to do its bidding. When asked for a comparative example 
of  a private versus public system, Norris usually referred to 
the Canadian public versus American private prices along the 
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Niagara River. However, analyzing Ontario Hydro, journalist 
Thomas Woodlock of  The Wall Street Journal excoriated public-
operated power in a November 1930 article alleging that private 
plants were more economical than public ones.73 The ferocity 
of  journalistic opposition to government-led Tennessee Valley 
proposals tended to lend some credence to the Senator’s 
statements that corporate power interests were colluding with 
the media to halt public expansions. 
 Hoover’s veto infuriated Southern Democrats and 
Midwestern Progressives who stood against the pro-Hoover 
Northeastern Republicans. The Senate attempted an override, 
but fell six votes short of  the two-thirds majority needed to 
do so with forty-nine votes for and thirty-four votes against.74 
Authoring a long, detailed explanation for his veto, Hoover 
suggested that Alabama and Tennessee could collaborate to 
develop the Tennessee Valley. He did, however, voice support for 
the construction of  the Cove Creek (later Norris) Dam on the 
Clinch River for flood regulation.75 Hoover felt that he needed 
Construction of  Cove Creek Dam, later renamed Norris Dam 
in honor of  Senator George W. Norris
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to delineate between the appropriate realms of  government and 
private operations. In his justification, the President remarked, 
“I hesitate to contemplate the future of  our institutions, of  our 
government and of  our country if  the preoccupation of  its 
officials is to be no longer the promotion of  justice and equal 
opportunity, but is to be devoted to barter in the markets. That 
is not liberalism, it is degeneration.”76
 Though businessmen and conservatives viewed Norris’ 
Muscle Shoals proposals as “degeneration,” the winds of  political 
change were blowing across the United States. The serious 
economic crisis was plunging millions into poverty. In particular, 
the rural poor faced the brunt of  the Great Depression, a 
calamity widely pinned to the excessive greed and speculation 
of  Wall Street financiers. As demands for government assistance 
increased, allegations of  socialistic planning decreased. 
Furthermore, the need for basic necessities, which increasingly 
included the provision of  electricity, aligned with the progressive 
ethos that in matters of  national interest, the moral imperative 
of  the ends justified the unilateralism of  the means. Seeing it 
as a modern necessity, Norris viewed electricity as “the breath 
of  life of  the machine age” and “essential to human activity.”77 
Economic Liberals such as Hoover, Coolidge, and later, Wendell 
Willkie saw electric power as a force of  progress, granted to 
the country through the vibrancy of  American capitalism and 
competition. Norris saw power as tantamount to a civil right. 
PROGRESSIVISM EMPOWERED
 Fresh off  his victory over President Herbert Hoover in 
the presidential election of  1932, President-Elect Franklin D. 
Roosevelt travelled to Alabama in January 1933 to tour Muscle 
Shoals. He delivered an informal speech on January 21 in 
Montgomery to a crowd that included the Governor of  Alabama. 
Roosevelt fused reverence for Alabama’s past with his progressive 
vision for the country. His message was clear. Standing in the 
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“birthplace of  the Confederacy,” Roosevelt outlined a bold 
future for the stagnating, suffering South, painting a future of  
“better opportunities and better places for living for millions” of  
people through “planning.”78
 As President Roosevelt prepared to deliver a furious 
volley of  ambitious New Deal legislation in the spring of  1933 
after his inauguration, Norris worked to bring his dream to 
fruition. Collaborating with Representative Lister Hill (D-AL) in 
the House of  Representatives, Norris developed S.J. 1272, known 
as the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of  1933. According to S.J. 
1272, the TVA was to be governed by a board of  commissioners 
selected by presidential appointment. In addition to ordering the 
operation of  experimental plants and laboratories for fertilizer 
production, the bill authorized the TVA to “produce, distribute, 
and sell electric power.”79 A New York Times article on the bill 
captured the novelty and revolutionary nature of  the TVA 
proposal:
The 1933 edition of  the Norris bill for the development 
of  Muscle Shoals follows the original model, with the 
[TVA] tacked on. Cheap fertilizer for the farmer, cheap 
light and power for the housewife. They are to be sought 
by putting government, directly, into the fertilizer and 
utility business, on almost a cosmic scale. The power 
plants are to be made a weapon in the war on the ‘Power 
Trust.’80
 Norris, who had faced recalcitrant Republican opposition 
during the 1920s, only received support from Roosevelt, whom 
Norris had supported in the presidential election of  1932. In 
April and May 1933, President Roosevelt worked to speed the 
TVA bill to passage.81 In a speech to Congress, Roosevelt spoke 
in the language of  the progressive civil religion of  infrastructure, 
calling for the “return to the spirit and vision of  the pioneer” 
through government “planning.” He preached that it was time 
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for the United States to create “a corporation clothed with the 
power of  Government…for the general social and economic 
welfare of  the Nation.”82 Where there was no hope, government 
would provide. Where there was no altruism, government would 
provide. The message from Roosevelt to an audience of  millions 
of  unemployed workers and tenant farmers, therefore, evoked 
the message that the government was there and ready to provide 
for and safeguard its constituents.
 On May 4, 1933, the TVA bill passed for the seventh 
and final time with a massive congressional majority. The House 
versions were less aggressive than Norris’ proposal, giving more 
room for government partnerships with private firms. The 
Nebraskan’s bill envisioned a TVA vertically integrated to master 
the river, derive electricity from dams, and then electrify the 
countryside. As usual, Norris garnered more Democratic than 
Republican support for his agenda.83 His image transformed as he 
brought his legislative power to bear for the President. Roosevelt 
needed a torchbearer in the Senate and Norris was a true believer 
in the New Deal. For Norris, the Roosevelt revolution was an 
opportunity to restore the power of  the people and democratize 
the progress that conservatives and big businesses thought must 
come from free enterprise. The TVA was a landmark change. 
While progressives had sought to regulate corporate greed and 
bust trusts for decades, progressive government would now 
replace business in the pursuit of  national progress. Thus, Norris 
the “son of  the wild jackass” was now Norris the New Dealer.84 
 Not all citizens and politicians shared the President’s 
enthusiasm for the TVA or for the unprecedented breadth 
of  Norris’ proposal. An article in The New York Times from 
April 1933 warned that the TVA should seek to develop the 
region in conjunction with existing private utilities. Concerned 
Norris’ proposal was too radical, the article suggested that the 
House versions provided a more reasonable compromise and 
consideration of  the various interests with stakes in the Tennessee 
Valley business:
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If  the Government is to embark on this venture at all, it 
is earnestly to be hoped that these saving clauses [from 
the House] will be retained in the bill, and an opportunity 
thus afforded the new Tennessee Valley Authority to 
work out its grandiose plans in cooperation with the 
utilities, rather than in cutthroat competition with them.85 
 Despite the article’s hope for “cooperation,” however, 
the relationship between the TVA and the private utilities would 
be defined by “cutthroat competition.” In fact, the seriousness of  
the competition dragged the TVA’s attention from dam-building 
to the U.S. Supreme Court. As the TVA’s mandate expanded, 
either through statute, precedent, or unilateral decision-
making, the private utilities’ propensity and ability to cooperate 
diminished, souring and hardening into indignant animosity. 
Fighting the full force of  the Roosevelt administration would 
prove a herculean feat, but as soon as the TVA started to act, 
opposition coalesced. Nevertheless, on June 16, 1933, less than 
a month after President Roosevelt signed the compromise bill, 
the Tennessee Valley Authority initiated operations. The federal 
government was officially in the power business.86
THE TRIUMPH OF THE
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
 Norris’ crusade to create the TVA was the signature 
campaign of  the progressive civil religion of  the 1930s. 
Distrustful of  corporations, skeptical of  state cooperation, 
and concerned for many of  the impoverished farmers of  
rural Tennessee and Alabama, the Nebraska Senator laced his 
statements and speeches with the language of  progressivism. It 
was the faith of  the Age of  Infrastructure. No longer content 
to check the excesses and injustices of  the free market, Norris 
and his colleagues let government lead the way through planning. 
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The spirit of  the progressive civil religion of  infrastructure went 
beyond the legislative birth of  the TVA and Norris’ determined 
efforts—it permeated the form and function of  the TVA as it 
reengineered southern Appalachia. 
 President Roosevelt appointed a three-man Board of  
Directors—David Lilienthal, Arthur Morgan, and Harcourt 
Morgan—to manage the TVA and oversee its ambitious agenda. 
The TVA’s plans for the region were bold. By the fall of  1944, 
nine main river dams were completed and generated electricity 
along the course of  the Tennessee River from Fort Loudoun 
Dam to Kentucky Dam, 628 miles downstream. Incorporating 
the two existing dams on the Tennessee River, Wilson and Hales 
Bar, the TVA built the remainder of  the main river dams as well 
as a number of  fossil fuel power plants, a plethora of  bridges, 
and numerous smaller electricity-generating and storage dams 
along the river’s tributaries.87 The TVA tamed the river through 
the creation of  massive reservoirs covering thousands of  acres 
and enabled navigation from Knoxville to the Gulf  of  Mexico.88 
Norris Dam, renamed in honor of  the Senator, dammed the 
Clinch River, a tributary of  the Tennessee River northeast of  
Knoxville. Formerly known as the Cove Creek Dam, the Norris 
Dam was the first line of  defense against damaging floods which 
devastated the Tennessee Valley, the Ohio Valley, and down to 
the Mississippi River. Apart from local destruction, frequent 
flooding degraded the already-depleted soil of  the Tennessee 
Valley.
 Part of  the TVA’s Norris Dam project included the 
construction of  a local settlement, also called Norris. The village, 
a master-planned community, included communal amenities and 
modern conveniences. Unlike many works camps of  the Great 
Depression, Norris was designed as a permanent community—the 
TVA’s model community.89 Even religious life was reformulated 
as a modern, ecumenical civil exercise. For example, the secular 
public school was the designated place of  worship for the 
inhabitants of  the village. While the village’s small size and rural 
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milieu influenced the lack of  appropriate facilities, the image of  
a unified community engaging in a religious exercise fell in-line 
with the vision of  the progressive civil religion of  infrastructure. 
Individual impediments to unity were to be overcome. Every 
prayer was a civil communion, and every concrete pour was 
alms for a needy nation. This civil ecumenicalism produced 
strident critics in the 1930s South. For example, responding 
to TVA regulations on church construction, a local southern 
governor admitted that he did not appreciate Norris’ progressive 
ecumenicalism, identifying such practices with “communism.”90 
But the TVA did not build a “godless town” in Norris, Tennessee; 
it built a new universal devotion—the religion of  communitarian 
progress in which all citizens could share material salvation on 
Earth. In his autobiography, Senator Norris admitted, “religious 
prejudice is the most deeply imbued prejudice that exists in 
the human heart.”91 Thus, the TVA brought the totality of  life 
within the public sphere, engineering egalitarianism through the 
progressive civil religion of  infrastructure.
 Much of  the TVA’s physical infrastructure also embodied 
the progressive civil religious ideals of  a perfectible society. To 
link Knoxville to the dam and the village, the TVA built a parkway 
praised by national critics for its fusion of  natural beauty with 
functionality.92 Under the TVA, a public work was more than a 
mere concrete highway or a hydroelectric dam. Aesthetic quality 
and permanence were key features, designed to maximize the 
experience and welfare of  the people. In every dam’s control 
room, the words “Built for the People of  the United States” 
were emblazoned in steely letters for all to see. Progressives 
of  the past had sought to cordon off  expanses of  American 
wilderness from negative human interference—conserving 
in the face of  capitalist progress. Progressives of  the Age of  
Infrastructure, however, sought to modify the world to suit their 
design for the people—engineering the alternative to capitalist 
progress. The architectural style of  the dams and other TVA 
facilities epitomized the forceful modernity that accompanied 
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this governing philosophy. A mixture of  brutalism, elegance, 
and industrial might defined the TVA dams along the Tennessee 
River and its tributaries. Art deco motifs graced turbine halls and 
bold lines defined the concrete hulks slicing into the verdant hills 
of  East Tennessee.
 The TVA’s quantitative contributions were as impressive 
as its buildings. By 1938, the TVA employed 13,000 men and 
women.93 By 1941, before the completion of  the last several dams, 
the TVA had 2,000,000 kilowatts of  capacity and it had carved 
out a 650-mile navigation channel along the sinuous Tennessee 
River. Scholars estimated that by the end of  1943, nearly $722 
million government dollars had been invested in navigation, 
flood control, and power projects for the TVA, amounting to 
an enormous sum. Millions of  southerners drew cheap power 
from the TVA grid through municipal and community local 
distributors. Thousands more enjoyed the parks, lakes, and 
recreational facilities built by the TVA along the winding course 
of  the river.94 The TVA was more than a development agency. It 
became the engine for the “arsenal of  democracy.”
 At one point during the Second World War, the TVA 
employed 42,000 workers. Its dams provided the energy for 
aluminum production, vital for the United States’ air forces. 
It also supplied power to a mysterious government project at 
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where Manhattan Project engineers 
harnessed the TVA’s vast electrical resources to enrich uranium 
for the United States’ first atomic weapons.95 The United States 
government used its investment in the TVA, along with its 
hydroelectric projects along the Columbia River in the Pacific 
Northwest, to beat ploughshares into swords and defeat fascism. 
Writing in 1958, author John Kyle reflected on the successes 
of  the TVA’s new society. Describing its developmental 
achievements and international fame, Kyle explained, “To many 
people the world over, the Tennessee Valley Authority represents 
the highest achievement of  American democracy.”96 
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Propoganda Poster from the Second World War 
Flaunting the Efficiency and Effectiveness of  the Tennessee Valley Authority 
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY IN TURMOIL
 The TVA’s flurry of  construction did not sate Norris’ 
appetite for progressive development. He set his sights on 
larger quarry: the Mississippi River Valley. In December 1935, 
Norris, extrapolating from a former plan for a “Missouri Valley 
Authority,” sought to cover half  the country under the aegis of  
a gargantuan government corporation.97 By 1937, his dreams 
were even more expansive. Delivering a statement at the White 
House Executive Office, Norris declared that “he was planning 
to introduce a bill authorizing creation of  an agency to build 
throughout the country a system of  flood control and power 
plants similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority.”98 Unfortunately 
for Senator Norris though, his bill and his dream of  a national 
TVA-esque agency died in the Senate.99 Still, this disappointment 
would prove the least of  his worries. The enemies of  the 
progressive civil religion of  infrastructure were coalescing.
 Throughout the 1930s, private system after private system 
sold out to the local municipalities and to the TVA—for example, 
Tennessee Public Service Co., Tennessee Light & Power Co., West 
Tennessee Power & Light Co., and Tennessee Electric Power Co. 
all sold off  operations to the TVA.100 While these acquisitions 
expanded the TVA’s ability to reach underserved populations, 
its imperious behavior provoked intense backlash from utility 
companies. The adoption of  the TVA model in other states was 
also faltering. Plans for a New York TVA-esque agency along the 
St. Lawrence River were derailed by inadequate funding measures 
and lack of  congressional support.101 Meanwhile, Norris’ former 
secretary and Comptroller General J.R. McCarl had “sharply 
questioned some of  [the] TVA’s purchasing methods.” On the 
defensive, therefore, the Nebraska Senator played his favorite 
political card by accusing McCarl of  allegiances to the “power-
trust.”102
 Norris, responding to these problems and other constant 
challenges to the TVA’s rather limited statutory authority, 
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proposed a bill to grant the TVA the explicit prerogative to 
“buy up private power facilities for resale to communities 
wanting a public power source.”103 His legislation also sought to 
double the TVA’s bond issuing capacity.104 The TVA leadership 
attempted to secure this statutory authorization for an expansion 
to TVA powers in the spring of  1935. But, to its frustration, 
the TVA Board found the House Military Affairs Committee, 
the committee overseeing the TVA, to be less than compliant 
with their wishes. The Committee tabled the House version of  
Norris’ bill, supported by original TVA sponsor and committee 
chairman John Jackson McSwain (D-SC).105 
 As the dams rose on the Tennessee River, the nation’s 
attention and criticism turned to the TVA. In 1936, however, 
120,000 high school debate students answered the question: 
“Resolved, that all electric utilities should be governmentally 
owned.” Herbert Corey, the journalist covering the event, made 
no secret of  his position on that matter, although he wrapped his 
bias in a thin veil of  manufactured impartiality: “public ownership 
as a policy has failed in the Americas. It might be a necessity in the 
backward European countries where the people have lacked the 
intelligence and the enterprise on which industrial advancement 
is based.”106 The rampant bias on both sides of  the TVA issue 
reflected how deeply ingrained the public versus private power 
ownership issue was in the American political consciousness of  
the 1930s.
 Businessmen involved in the coal business were also 
concerned by the TVA’s activities. Senator Norris, unreserved 
in his criticism of  capitalist complaints, unleashed his usual 
indictments that businessmen were interfering in the national 
pilgrimage to public power. During the original struggle for 
the TVA’s passage, John L. Lewis, a coal executive, became one 
of  Norris’ targets. The Senator alleged, “Mr. Lewis’ attitude 
simply demonstrated that any man who stands in the way of  
human progress and seeks to prevent the use of  technological 
improvements is standing in his own way and blocking his 
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own progress.” Norris did not elaborate on who was granted 
the power to define “human progress.” Throughout the Age 
of  Infrastructure, Norris and his compatriots were completely 
convinced that their opinions were irreproachably correct and 
moral. Then, they married this unwavering confidence with 
technocratic implementation. Victory, not compromise, was 
the goal. Understandably, this recalcitrant orthodoxy generated 
problems. The opposition to the TVA was not limited to errant 
journalists soapboxing through public interest pieces or corporate 
representatives. A serious and determined resistance to the TVA’s 
encroachment emerged. Nevertheless, one of  the TVA’s greatest 
challenges was endogenous. Something was rotten in Knoxville. 
 The TVA’s triumvirate leadership began to disintegrate. 
The problems had begun shortly after the foundation of  the 
TVA in 1933, though it took several years for the severity of  
the dissention to permeate the public sphere. Chairman Arthur 
Morgan clashed with his fellow board members David Lilienthal 
and Harcourt Morgan over significant executive decisions. 
What had been a private struggle, especially between Chairman 
Morgan and Lilienthal, devolved into a public rhetorical brawl 
when Chairman Morgan levied indictments of  mismanagement 
and negligence against Lilienthal. For example, Chairman 
Morgan accused Lilienthal of  mishandling the negotiations with 
Alcoa over the Fontana Dam in North Carolina. Still, this was 
only one case in a succession of  outlandish accusations in which 
Chairman Morgan publically directed towards Lilienthal. After 
the Chairman interfered unreasonably in another spat known as 
the Berry marble issue, Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan wrote 
to President Roosevelt requesting that Arthur Morgan resign.107 
However, Roosevelt, the only significant check on the Chairman’s 
power, did nothing. 
 Eventually, Arthur Morgan forced the President’s 
hand. After demanding a congressional investigation into the 
activities of  the other board members and suspicious TVA 
actions, Roosevelt sacked Chairman Morgan in March 1938. 
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The defamation continued during the subsequent investigation. 
Lilienthal and Harcourt Morgan alleged that Arthur Morgan had 
tried to “sabotage” the TVA as an agent of  the power trust.108 
Arthur Morgan shot back, making a series of  charges including 
“mismanagement of  the power program, conspiracy, and 
subservience to…special interests.”109 Throughout the summer 
of  1938, Lilienthal parried attacks from Arthur Morgan and the 
press, referring to the Chairman as “reckless, unreliable, and 
erratic.”110
 The “TVA Scandal” wrought havoc, distracting from 
the completion of  TVA priorities and fueling the agency’s 
critics. Arthur Morgan launched a messy lawsuit only to be 
defeated in the courts, further sullying his already-tainted image. 
Although the scandal abated, the series of  events tarnished the 
TVA’s administrative record. Confidence in the governance of  
appointed experts, thought to be immune to the petty politicking 
of  Congress and the underhanded tactics of  the business elites, 
was shaken. The Morgan crisis reminded Norris and the radical 
New Dealers of  an unpleasant reality. Many men, not just Henry 
Ford, were driven by avarice and a lust for the aggregation of  
power. Business, especially in the unregulated 1920s, was bluntly 
motivated by profit, much to Norris’ disgust. However, despite 
what Norris would have liked to have thought, government 
was no monolith of  unending altruism. It, like business, was 
composed of  men who sought to exercise a vision and the means 
to power. 
 The strife between Arthur Morgan and his two comrades 
illustrated how personal and petty concerns could derail the 
holy project of  the TVA. As the agency made great strides in 
raising dams along the rivers and stringing transmission lines 
along country roads, the TVA was bogged down in politics 
and hearings, eventually necessitating intervention from the 
President. Norris had handed the Board an immense amount 
of  institutional power backed by the full faith and credit of  the 
United States. The Morgan crisis proved that although the TVA 
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could reshape the countryside to suit man’s desires, it could 
not, even with its noble mandate, reshape those desires. It also 
demonstrated that the TVA, with its unusually long nine-year 
appointments for Board members, was as corruptible as any 
other government institution.
WENDELL WILLKIE’S WAR
 Chairman Arthur Morgan, though troublesome, was not 
the greatest foe the TVA faced during the 1930s. The TVA’s rapid 
expansion had generated enemies, and the power utilities grew 
increasingly concerned, especially as Norris proposed ever-bolder 
plans for a nationwide TVA-esque agency that would replace 
private power corporations. Throughout its early years, the TVA 
interacted with Commonwealth & Southern Corporation (C&S), 
a major U.S. utility holding company, and its dynamic, articulate 
president, Wendell Willkie. Concerned by government’s entry 
into the electricity market, Willkie proved more than a match for 
Lilienthal in Knoxville and Norris in Washington, D.C. as they 
fought over the future of  energy in the United States. Willkie 
challenged the fullest expression of  the progressive civil religion 
of  infrastructure, seeking to check the excesses of  the New Deal 
to preserve the competitive system that he and others felt was 
so central to the United States’ economic success and culture of  
individual liberty.
 In modern times, Wendell Willkie is best remembered 
as the Republican challenger to Roosevelt in the presidential 
election of  1940. That election was notable because Roosevelt 
broke with the Washingtonian tradition and marched towards an 
unprecedented third term in office with a healthy lead in votes. 
However, Willkie was no stooge of  the Republican establishment, 
nor was he a conservative purist. He was a dynamic, eloquent 
candidate and the most potent foe of  the TVA. Willkie was no 
politician either; he was hardly even a Republican, having been a 
Democrat until 1939. He was a business executive, trained as an 
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attorney, and eminently successful at his work. Promoted from 
counsel to president of  the influential C&S in 1933, Willkie was 
positioned to take control of  the company just as the TVA began 
organizing. More specifically, Willkie assumed authority when 
the TVA was poised to develop electricity systems in a region 
where the C&S already had a significant subsidiary presence. 
 Ironically, Willkie, a registered Democrat at the time 
and a regular attendee of  national party conventions, became 
the champion of  the anti-TVA movement. He stood against a 
Republican, Senator Norris, who stridently backed every New 
Deal proposal and fought for the TVA on every occasion.111 
Norris’ progressive faith, which previously had confounded 
partisanship, and Willkie’s defense of  economic liberty, made for 
strange alliances. Over the course of  the 1930s, Willkie would 
force Norris to shield the TVA, at the public podium and in 
the Capitol. The Nebraskan had fought for more than decade 
to tame the Tennessee River for the people of  the United States. 
Now, he would have to fight to keep it. 
Wendell Willkie, 
President of  Commonwealth 
& Southern Corporation
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 The TVA entered negotiations with C&S in 1933 to 
discuss a modus vivendi. In January 1934, C&S and the TVA reached 
a settlement in which the TVA agreed not to enter certain areas 
nor take C&S customers until a few months after the completion 
of  the Norris Dam. Much to the consternation of  C&S, the TVA 
immediately sped up construction of  the dam. Meanwhile, the 
TVA also strung transmission lines around cities currently served 
by utility companies and offered economic incentives for those 
municipalities to switch service to TVA power.112 Willkie strongly 
opposed the double standards which he felt were applied to the 
TVA. He argued that if  the TVA was subjected to the same 
“requirements binding private utilities,” it could not survive 
in the marketplace. Beyond general complaints of  unfairness, 
Willkie’s primary concern was the TVA’s creeping mandate. 
Congress tried to set limits on the scope of  its powers in the 
1935 bills through amendments in the appropriations package. 
However, the New Deal legislators had intervened, stripping 
out provisions that would have required audits, prohibited the 
sale of  surplus power under cost, and prevented the duplication 
of  transmission lines.113 Willkie, therefore, delivered a forceful 
condemnation of  this interference.114
 In 1935, Willkie railed against the TVA “yardstick” 
concept, a means to test the fairness of  electricity rates, and other 
TVA “frantic activity” that he viewed as designed to erode private 
utilities through unfair practices.115 President Roosevelt had first 
invoked the “yardstick” concept during his campaign in the 
presidential election of  1932 as a means through which the TVA 
could check the ability of  private operators to raise prices, similar 
to the discussions on rates that were seen in the Muscle Shoals 
hearings in 1922.116 Indeed, the “yardstick” concept was not 
included in the original TVA legislation, which troubled Willkie 
and other private operators. They felt that the TVA, afforded 
government advantages, would be a privileged competitor that 
would gradually encroach on their businesses. This was a correct 
assumption. Additionally, Willkie assumed that the trend of  
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subsidizing consumers “at the expense of  taxpayers” through 
government intervention would, if  not restrained, threaten the 
entirety of  the U.S. utility market.117 Furthermore, many private 
operators believed that the “yardstick” concept was less of  a 
means of  protecting consumers and more of  a ploy to bludgeon 
control of  power systems into government hands. To be sure, 
Roosevelt admitted in 1934 that “where the private interest and 
this public interest conflict, the public interest must prevail.”118 
Electric power had become the cynosure of  debate over the 
TVA.
 Corporate apprehensions about the growth of  the 
TVA’s mandate and intentions were substantiated by the 
difference between the focus of  the authorizing legislation—the 
Tennessee Valley Authority Act of  1933—which provided for 
the precedent-supported government regulation of  rivers for 
navigation and flood control, and the apparent driving focus 
of  the TVA, supplanting private power utilities. Electric power 
generation and transmission had been secondary elements of  
an April 1933 Senate Committee report for the TVA bill. The 
clear intention of  the bill was for flood control and navigation 
in the Tennessee Valley as well as the production of  fertilizers at 
Muscle Shoals. In fact, the report only mentions electric power in 
Clause Five.119 When one reflects upon the original intent of  the 
National Defense Act of  1916, the scope of  the transformation 
is even broader. Muscle Shoals began as an effort to produce 
critical nitrate for U.S. farmers and for the war effort during the 
First World War. The electric power was a means to produce 
that nitrate. By 1933, however, the project had evolved into a 
federal power scheme. This exercise of  federal prerogative was 
supported with little if  any precedent.
 Willkie blamed overzealous New Dealers for the TVA’s 
alleged overreaching. He released a statement in January 1938 
alleging that the TVA was as much an effort to neuter the 
private utility industry as it was to build infrastructure for the 
impoverished people of  the Tennessee Valley:
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There was no utility problem in the Tennessee Valley 
until the Federal Government created it. As soon as 
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was passed in June 
1933, however, the Federal Government began to flood 
the Tennessee Valley with both money and propaganda 
on behalf  of  the government power projects. The 
government built dams, power plants, and transmission 
lines.120
Willkie, hoping to reach a workable arrangement with the TVA 
that protected the core interests of  C&S, had been willing to 
negotiate with Lilienthal in the early days of  TVA activities. As 
political scientist C. Herman Pritchett notes, “Several times during 
this period[,] Willkie, president of  Commonwealth & Southern, 
met with Lilienthal, power director of  the T.V.A., and presented 
suggestions for a division of  areas between the two agencies.”121 
However, Lilienthal was unwilling to negotiate, believing that the 
accommodation of  the private power interests was “contrary 
to the provisions of  the T.V.A. statute.”122 Whether demanding 
hard territorial limits on TVA activities from Roosevelt, 
litigating against the TVA over competition issues, or speaking 
to the American people with “a fluency and eloquence,” Willkie 
defended the principles of  American free enterprise against 
the power of  the popular progressive civil religion.123 Willkie’s 
national prominence opened his path to challenge Roosevelt 
in the presidential election of  1940, by which time he finally 
changed his registration to Republican.
 Willkie’s war and the TVA’s internal challenges tempered 
the scope of  Norris’ ambitions for government-operated 
utilities. Willkie reminded the American people that while 
the government could advance the public good, it could also 
advance it beyond appropriate, constitutional boundaries. The 
political intransigence of  the Muscle Shoals project in the 1920s 
suffocated development in the Tennessee Valley. For the farmers 
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of  Alabama and Tennessee, Congress moved too slowly. The 
TVA marched forward at a breakneck pace, erecting dams and 
electrifying counties. For some, the TVA was moving too quickly 
and without consideration for the consequences of  its actions.
 Some critics of  Norris’ proposals had warned of  
creeping socialism or bureaucratic planners run amok. Vehement 
opposition to government operations in the Tennessee Valley 
only served to prove the progressives’ point—the profit motive 
had corrupted every echelon of  society. Willkie’s strategic 
criticisms and trust-building efforts were far more constructive. 
He served as a necessary and natural check on the TVA. When 
it erred, Willkie pointed it out. When it ran roughshod over 
business interests, he illuminated the transgressions and offered 
proposals. Willkie tempered the excesses of  the progressive civil 
religion of  infrastructure. His efforts established a tenable middle 
ground between Norris’ dreams of  the total nationalization of  
utilities and the laissez-faire economics that epitomized the 
former Coolidge administration. Through that mediation, the 
nation achieved a workable coexistence between government-
led progress and individual-led progress. The TVA stands as a 
unique institution in the United States. Norris failed to realize his 
dream of  public power nationwide. However, the TVA survived 
the 1930s, remaining as a robust experiment that provided cheap 
power and good jobs to the people of  the Tennessee Valley.
THE AGE OF INFRASTRUCTURE
 The Age of  Infrastructure witnessed some of  the 
greatest public achievements in the United States. The TVA 
brought power to the people, bringing a vision of  hope to one 
of  the country’s poorest regions. It proved that government 
would not forget the most vulnerable Americans. Its successes 
represented the epitome of  Norris’ populist progressivism—
government, as a vanguard, would build a better society through 
the provision of  economic empowerment. The TVA was a 
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national effort, transcending the sectionalism of  pettier politics. 
Its foremost advocates included a plutocratic president from the 
Hudson River Valley and an agrarian populist senator from the 
Great Plains. For Norris, the United States was at its best when 
it led by example. This informed his isolationist tendencies and 
his commitment to communitarian modernism. Writing in 1944, 
Norris expressed a hope for a brave, new future of  American 
politics:
But so long as an unselfish leadership remains for [the 
American people’s] guidance—a leadership untainted 
by corrupting personal ambition—a leadership inspired 
by the simple strength that oozes from the soil and the 
humble ranks of  the poor—and at time is enriched 
and fortified enormously by the support and voice of  
those who wear purple robes of  great wealth—I am 
sure America can continue to be the bright beacon 
toward which the eyes of  the world’s oppressed and 
downtrodden will turn for inspiration and hope.124
The greatest tragedy of  Norris’ career was the dearth of  
Americans who could provide the “unselfish leadership” he 
desired. The destructive squabbling of  the TVA triumvirs proved 
that even the people’s technocracy was susceptible to the baser 
demons of  human nature.
 The TVA’s troubles paled compared to exploitations 
of  progressivism by men of  truly unbridled “personal 
ambition.” For them, the ends always justified the means and 
the Age of  Infrastructure created unparalleled methods for the 
materialization of  their vision. Under a banner of  social reform 
and modernity, city planner Robert Moses, another great builder 
of  public works, obtained unprecedented and unchecked power 
in New York. As he built an administrative empire, he cultivated 
and greedily protected his autonomous authority from any 
encroachment. Exploiting the ascendancy of  public investment 
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in infrastructure and justifying his actions under the broad 
umbrella of  societal progress, Moses bludgeoned any opponent 
who sought, like Norris’ Willkie, to moderate his activities. With 
imperious arrogance, Moses once remarked, “There are people 
who like things as they are…They cannot be permitted to stand 
in the way of  progress.”125 As he flattened poor and minority 
neighborhoods to build titanic highways, Moses meant this 
statement in its most literal sense. Either the people would move 
or he would move them.
 The TVA’s failings and Robert Moses’ autocracy 
revealed the dangers inherent to the progressive civil religion of  
infrastructure.126 Intention, regardless of  its moral rationalization, 
did not guarantee purely altruistic governance. The overarching 
theme of  this political faith was a profound confidence, bordering 
on arrogance, that the progressive powerbrokers knew what 
was best for the people. Unwavering faith in the righteousness 
of  one’s opinions translated into wholesale, uncompromising 
implementation and a flawed belief  that one could reengineer 
society to conform to their idea of  a democratic utopia. 
Institutions of  merit without checks became the realms of  the 
bureaucratic oligarchy.
 In forming the model of  the United States’ constitutional 
representative republic, James Madison recognized that 
government would need to check private ambitions for the 
safety of  the body politic. Progressives, including Woodrow 
Wilson, thought this cautious conservative form of  government 
obsolete for the modern age. Norris did worry about the 
ambitions of  men such as Henry Ford or the “power trusters,” 
but he equated the threat with unbridled industrial capitalism, 
not an overzealous government. Norris failed to recognize how 
his own works, however well-intentioned, created new, and often 
thoroughly undemocratic, avenues for the individual pursuit of  
power at the public’s expense. Sadly for this “gentle knight of  
American democracy,” his endless compassion for the plight of  
the poor was tainted by his own naïveté.127
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 Despite these setbacks, Norris’ contributions to building 
American democracy were monumental. During the 1920s, his 
national perspective and resolute integrity reinforced the people’s 
faith in their government in an era of  regionalism and endless 
scandals. In the 1930s, his ideology formed the rock upon which 
the New Deal was formed. Working hand-in-hand with President 
Roosevelt, Norris used an economic crisis to direct Americans’ 
attention to people whose Great Depression began decades earlier 
through a systematic pattern of  neglect, underinvestment, and 
environmental degradation. Through his determination, Norris 
took a weapon of  war, the Muscle Shoals project, and converted 
it into an instrument for the public welfare. Fittingly, the TVA 
would work to protect American democracy through a renewal 
of  equality and its defense against the forces of  fascism. Senator 
Norris’ strain of  progressivism shunned individualism while 
embracing communitarianism. It substantiated massive increases 
in federal authority while illuminating the darkest of  valleys. The 
TVA was the public church for a new civil religion: a nationalist, 
equalitarian, and materialist crusade for the betterment of  the 
people. Norris’ sermon was that the government’s responsibility 
was the promotion of  “happiness in this life” for all people, 
nationwide. His mission lives on in the rivers he mastered, the 
farms he electrified, and the futures he “Built for the People of  
the United States.”
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Public Schools as Loci for Human 
Experimentation: Implications of Using 
Public Schools to House the Polio 
Vaccine Field Trial of 1954
Will Schupmann
 In 1954, schoolchildren all across the United States par-
ticipated in one of  the largest medical experiments in history. 
Organized and carried out in public schools by the National 
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, the field trial tested the safety 
and efficacy of  Jonas Salk’s vaccine for poliomyelitis (polio). The 
trial’s success was celebrated as a stunning and revolutionary tri-
umph of  science and medicine; just two years before, Americans 
had faced the largest epidemic of  polio on record, permanently 
paralyzing twenty-one thousand individuals, but the trial’s suc-
cess signaled an end to this era.1
 The story of  polio in the United States is well told; there 
is a great deal of  scholarship on the history of  polio, the experi-
ence of  living with the disease, the advent of  Salk’s vaccine, and 
the success and legacy of  the field trial.2 This paper, however, 
adds to the scholarship by providing a critical perspective on the 
role of  public schools in shaping public perceptions of  and par-
ticipation in the trial. There has been no discussion to date on 
how schools as institutions played a significant part in human 
experimentation in the twentieth century.
 Polio, and its defeat, is as thoroughly embedded in the 
history of  American culture as it is in the history of  medicine 
and public health. As historians James Colgrove and Daniel Wil-
son state, the image of  a quadriplegic child dependent on the 
iconic “iron lung” respirator was deeply ingrained in the Ameri-
can conscious and prompted parents to keep their children away 
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from public playgrounds, swimming pools, and movie theaters 
during the summertime.3 The National Foundation for Infantile 
Paralysis (NFIP, known as the March of  Dimes today) was cru-
cial in making the disease a media sensation year after year and 
drumming up public support and funding for the development 
of  a vaccine.4 In addition, the fact that polio prevailed—on epi-
demic proportions—in such a scientifically advanced nation as 
the United States also motivated the quest for a vaccine.
 The use of  public schools in hosting the field trial in 
In this cartoon commissioned in 1943 by the U.S. Office of  War Information, 
the girl’s struggle with infantile paralysis (polio) is likened to the country’s 
struggle in the Second World War. Therefore, it is not surprising that fight-
ing against polio—including participating in the vaccine’s trial—assumed a 
nationalistic tone. Furthermore, the cartoon attempts to instill an intense fear 
of  the disease in the viewer through depicting polio as monstrous.
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1954 is significant because while it was common for non-ex-
perimental vaccines to be administered in public spaces such as 
schools and community centers, human experimentation was, 
for the most part, carried out in clinical settings. Few historians 
have examined the role of  schools in the field trial, and practi-
cally no one has questioned the implications of  using schools as 
opposed to clinical settings for human experimentation.5 In fact, 
despite public schools having been used multiple times through-
out the early- to mid-twentieth century as loci for human experi-
mentation, historians of  bioethical issues have not examined this 
phenomenon either.6 The most closely related scholarship in the 
history of  bioethics is perhaps the work examining the use of  
institutionalized children (children living in orphanages or asy-
lums), prisoners, and college and university students as research 
subjects in the twentieth century.7
 Thus, this paper sheds light on the implications of  using 
public schools as loci for the polio vaccine field trial. Indeed, the 
use of  public schools made the experiment appear more akin to 
a mass vaccination campaign rather than what it truly was: a field 
trial testing the vaccine’s safety and efficacy. 
 The paper begins by exploring why, despite the fact that 
an explosion of  experimentation following the conclusion of  the 
Second World War in 1945 occurred almost exclusively in hospi-
tals, schools were used nonetheless as sites for the polio vaccine 
trial. It then describes how the use of  public schools altered per-
ceptions of  and participation in the trial. Conducting the trial in 
a school setting as opposed to a clinical setting prevented parents 
from making an informed decision on whether to allow their 
children to participate because there was a dearth of  adequate 
information about its experimental nature. Moreover, the use of  
public schools contributed to the nationalistic perception that 
families had a moral obligation to participate for the utility of  
one’s community and country. Furthermore, the public nature of  
schools caused parents to make their decisions based in part on 
what others, such as their neighbors and friends, were choosing 
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to do. And finally, the authority inherent to schools and school 
officials in local communities legitimized the trial as something 
students should take part in. In effect, schools as public spaces 
have connotations and significations quite different from those 
of  hospitals and doctors’ offices, and these distinctions influ-
enced the perceptions of  the polio field trial and should continue 
to inform our understanding of  research ethics.
CLINICAL SETTINGS AS CONVENTIONAL SPACES 
FOR EXPERIMENTATION
 The rise to prominence of  biomedicine and the medical 
profession during the early- to mid-twentieth century resulted in 
a concomitant increase in human subjects research, and the clini-
cal setting became the primary location in which cases of  experi-
mentation took place. During the early decades of  the twentieth 
century, research units were established in existing hospitals, and 
new, research-specific hospitals were built.8 As historian Susan 
Lederer notes, clinical research was such an integral part of  the 
medical profession and of  the hospital setting by this time that 
clinical investigators argued that “patients actually received bet-
ter care [in research hospitals] than patients in a hospital where 
research was not a priority.”9 Indeed, Lederer writes that Rufus 
Cole, Director of  the Hospital of  the Rockefeller Institute for 
Medical Research in 1927, asserted that “the rich and the poor…
rushed to fill the available [research] hospital beds, because they 
had learned that the best medical care was available in institutions 
where patients were studied scientifically.”10 Historian David 
Rothman concurs that research hospitals were where the explo-
sion of  human experimentation occurred. He states, “Subjects 
were now more likely to be a group of  patients in a particular 
hospital rather than neighbors or kin.”11 Physicians regularly ad-
ministered new drugs to sick patients in research hospitals who 
were looking for anything with “therapeutic potential.”12
 Given the prevalence of  human subjects research carried 
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out in hospitals during the early- to mid-twentieth century, it is 
surprising that schools served as a site of  experimentation. An 
explanation may be found in how the public viewed the role of  
schools in children’s health and how there was an existing rela-
tionship between schools and vaccination campaigns.
SCHOOLS AS EXISTING SITES FOR MEDICAL CARE 
AND EDUCATION
 Beyond providing a large, convenient supply of  partici-
pants, public schools were perceived as a logical space in which 
to carry out the polio vaccine field trial because they played a 
significant role in the health care of  children in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Medical and cultural his-
torian Richard Meckel describes how urban primary schools 
were directly involved in monitoring and improving the health 
of  schoolchildren from around 1870 until the beginning of  
the Great Depression in the late 1920s.13 Despite the fact that 
around the 1930s schools shifted away from medical provision, 
schools remained active as guardians of  children’s health in the 
mid-twentieth century, offering students health education and 
acting as intermediaries between children and community health 
services. In fact, schools played an important role in children’s 
health when it came to polio in particular.
 The role of  schools and teachers in children’s health in 
the 1930s is apparent from an article entitled, “Responsibility of  
the Teacher for Child Health,” published in 1937 in the journal 
Childhood Education, the self-described “Magazine for Teachers of  
Young Children.” The author states:
Adequate health care for children represents a combi-
nation of  family and community interests and responsi-
bilities. The home is the center of  the child’s life and the 
parents chiefly determine what provision is made for the 
health of  the family. However, those responsible for ed-
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ucation of  the child outside the home must of  necessity 
share in supporting and continuing this provision. This 
can best be done in close rapport with the family, with 
family-health workers, and with other specialists in the 
field of  child health—pediatricians, nutritionists, mental 
hygienists, and dentists.14
Ensuring that a community’s children were in proper health was 
a collaborative effort among parents, teachers, and health care 
providers. It is telling that the article describes students as under 
the “care” of  their teacher, not merely the instruction.15 Teach-
ers were charged with including in their students’ education 
health behaviors that either reinforced what was being taught 
at home or, more notably, supplemented or corrected what was 
being taught at home. The author writes, “[The] responsibility 
devolves upon the teacher for continuing the health direction 
and guidance initiated in the home, and, sometimes for helping 
children to establish in the school health attitudes and practices 
that will stimulate parents to make more adequate health provi-
sion in the homes.”16 In other words, public schools were an op-
portunity for the state or for the community to actually educate 
parents in addition to children on the health behaviors they should 
be carrying out at home. Furthermore, teachers were instructed 
to “informally” observe for signs of  poor health in their inter-
actions with students, which, given the frequency with which 
they saw their students, was seen as a practical measure teachers 
should take. Teachers would subsequently participate in “joint 
health conference[s]” with a physician, each student, the child’s 
parents, and the school nurse.17
 The responsibilities of  teachers in 1937 were similar to 
those of  teachers about a decade later, when polio epidemics 
were most severe.18 An article entitled “If  Polio Comes” that 
was published in the National Education Association Journal in 1950 
outlines what the role of  teachers should be in the nation’s fight 
against polio.19 The essay aimed to educate teachers about the 
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disease and point them to additional literature available from the 
NFIP (including A Highschool [sic] Unit on Poliomyelitis) so that 
teachers could “clear away misconceptions” of  the disease in 
“science classes and in contacts with parents.”20 Therefore, just 
as in 1937, teachers were educated in the practices parents could 
implement at home and were expected to help disseminate this 
information. Teachers were also instructed to look out for symp-
toms of  the disease and to notify parents and physicians of  any 
findings:
Only the teacher, aside from parents, can make a daily 
check on the individual child. Even the parent does not 
see a child with quite the same perspective as the teacher. 
This does not mean the teacher can replace a doctor or 
school nurse—it is recommended that post polio pa-
tients have a physical examination every six months for a 
year or more. But the teacher has the advantage of  see-
ing children daily at work and play in the school…The 
watchful eye of  a teacher who has been alerted to these 
signals can be the first to detect a slight limp, an unsteadi-
ness of  hand, or a change in posture.21
Further, polio was a visible disease in part because its chron-
ic nature meant that many of  the children who were infected 
still attended school (or returned after a period of  time). In ef-
fect, teachers and students alike knew first-hand what the dis-
ease “looked like,” and it became something they experienced 
in school. For example, Our Schools, a publication of  the West 
Virginia Education Association, discussed how teachers and stu-
dents had a responsibility to help children infected by polio re-
store the convalescent’s sense of  self-confidence and to “prevent 
[the inflicted children from] developing an inferiority complex 
and a feeling of  disability.”22 Thus, schools played a significant 
role in children’s health in the decades before the polio field trial, 
and they also served as sources of  authority and information on 
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polio. In effect, it may have been perceived as logical that schools 
served as spaces in which polio was defeated. 
 As government-owned institutions and centers for com-
munities, public schools also served as sites for mass vaccina-
tion campaigns run by city health departments throughout the 
twentieth century. For example, schools were among the loca-
tions such campaigns targeted to immunize susceptible children 
against diphtheria during the 1920s. In fact, newspaper articles 
from this decade report the use of  schools for vaccination cam-
paigns in cities all over the country, including Long Beach, Cali-
fornia; Newburgh, New York; Providence, Rhode Island; and 
Washington, D. C.23 Vaccination campaigns against smallpox 
were also located in public schools. An article from The Los An-
geles Times in 1951 describes that the annual drive planned to visit 
105 schools and vaccinate about 35,000 students.24 In addition to 
serving as sites for vaccination campaigns, many public schools 
required that their students receive vaccinations in order to at-
tend. This requirement was deemed constitutional in 1922 as 
a result of  the United States Supreme Court ruling of  Zucht v. 
King.25 In this way, schools were not only seen as existing sites for 
medical care and education, but the youngest members of  the 
public were also accustomed to receiving vaccinations in schools 
as well as for schools. 
 Lastly, schools may have been perceived as the appropri-
ate space in which to carry out the field trial because the experi-
ment was testing a vaccine, not a medical procedure or pharma-
ceutical drug. In other words, hospitals served as the primary sites 
for human experimentation, and these trials were conducted on 
sick patients who enrolled in the research projects with the hope 
of—as Rothman describes it—“therapeutic potential.” Vaccines, 
however, were understood as a preventive measure that healthy 
individuals could partake in to remain out of  the hospital. The 
manner in which the public during this time period understood 
vaccines in relation to human experimentation is worth further 
exploration.
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 While public schools appeared to be the most logical 
space in which to carry out the trial, what follows is a description 
of  the implications of  using schools on the public’s perception 
of  and participation in the trial.
SOURCES OF AUTHORITY AND INFORMATION
ON THE FIELD TRIAL
 Carrying out the trial in schools as opposed to clinical 
settings caused the media, the NFIP, and schools to be parents’ 
primary sources of  information, not physicians. In effect, it is 
questionable as to what extent parents’ decisions in agreeing to 
participate in the trial were adequately informed. While there was 
a great deal of  information available to parents to help them 
make their decisions, these sources were primarily journalistic ac-
counts of  the trial or, essentially, propaganda from the NFIP. A 
1958 study entitled, “Parental Reactions to Communications on 
the 1954 Polio Vaccine Tests,” examined the sources of  infor-
mation parents received and concluded that beginning in 1953, 
newspapers and magazines regularly contained educational ar-
ticles written by journalists with titles such as “D-day Against 
Polio,” “Mass Polio Tests,” “The Fight on Polio,” “Tracking the 
Killer,” “The Great Test,” “Polio: At Last the End of  the Crip-
pler,” “Closing in on Polio,” “Vaccine Safety,” and “Polio Pio-
neers.”26 In addition, children brought home from school a let-
ter from Basil O’Connor, President of  the NFIP, explaining the 
importance of  participating in the trial; a leaflet explaining the 
nature of  the vaccine and the trial; and a consent form which 
was to be filled out and returned to school.27
 Based on these newspaper and magazine articles, not 
surprisingly, the objectives of  the trial were fairly ambiguous. Of-
ficially, the NFIP stated that the vaccine had already been proven 
safe and that the field trial was merely validating its efficacy. To be 
sure, Salk had performed a number of  successful though small-
scale trials throughout the early 1950s to test his potential vac-
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cine, including at the D.T. Watson Home for Crippled Children 
and at the Polk State School.28 Given how rare and geographi-
cally variable polio was, however, a large trial lending enough 
statistical power was still needed to prove the vaccine’s success 
definitively.29 Indeed, an article published in Parent’s Magazine in 
1954 describes how trials carried out among both monkeys and 
humans showed that the vaccine was safe and stimulated anti-
body production, but “at least 500,000 children must [still] be 
vaccinated in order to procure reliable evidence on the effective-
ness of  the vaccine.”30
 However, some articles diverged from the NFIP’s offi-
cial stance that the experiment was testing the vaccine’s efficacy, 
claiming that the vaccine’s efficacy had already been proven. For 
example, an article published in Better Homes and Gardens in 1954 
asserts that the vaccine has already been proven effective: “The 
Salk triple vaccine…has proved safe and effective against all 
three strains in some 5,000 preliminary tests.” Similarly, an article 
published in School Life states that the vaccine “has already been 
tested for safety and effectiveness, first in studies with laboratory 
animals and then with nearly 700 individuals.”31 Oddly though, 
the same article contradicts this assertion, conceding, “Whether 
the vaccine is highly effective, moderately effective, or ineffective 
will be proved conclusively through the forthcoming mass tests 
with children.”32 The lack of  agreement and clarity in describing 
the scientific objectives of  the field trial proves that the trial’s 
experimental nature was not adequately captured in the informa-
tion parents received and processed.
 In addition to the ambiguity concerning the trial’s objec-
tives, the information parents received did not adequately de-
scribe legitimate safety concerns that physicians and research-
ers who were familiar with the production of  the vaccine had 
possessed. Indeed, many doctors, including Albert Sabin who 
went on to produce the orally administered version of  the polio 
vaccine, thought that Salk’s vaccine was not ready to be used 
on a mass scale.33 Their concerns originated from the difficulty 
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some pharmaceutical companies had in inactivating the virus; 
in fact, Cutter Laboratories unsuccessfully inactivated the virus 
during production for widespread use in 1955, unintentionally 
causing hundreds of  children to become infected with the dis-
ease.34 Nevertheless, there was no mention of  the various safety 
concerns related to the vaccine’s production in these articles or 
in the material sent home from the public schools.
 Furthermore, there was some doubt as to whether par-
ents even understood the full extent of  the information sent out 
from the schools and the NFIP. A study featured in the article 
“Parental Reactions to Communications” assessed, “‘The read-
ing ease’ score placed the N.F.I.P. printed materials in the ‘diffi-
cult’ reading category comparable to textbook materials used in 
colleges.” Since over one-third of  the mothers in the study had 
less than a high-school education though, the study surmised, “It 
seems safe to infer that many of  them must have had a great deal 
of  difficulty in reading and understanding the printed materials 
sent to them from the schools.”35 The study also suggested that 
the sources of  information that the schools and the NFIP relied 
upon were “middle-class oriented,” indicating that parents of  a 
high socioeconomic status were more likely to allow their chil-
dren to participate in the trial.36 Even so, 43 percent of  parents 
of  low socioeconomic status gave consent for their children to 
receive the vaccine, suggesting that there were still many parents 
who may not have adequately understood the information they 
received about the trial.37
 These sources were crucial though, since they were large-
ly what parents based their decisions on; most parents did not 
talk about the trial with their family physicians, who, like Albert 
Sabin, may have been less biased and more alert to the fact that 
there were legitimate discernable concerns relating to the experi-
ment. A study entitled, “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation 
of  Children in Polio Vaccine Trials,” interviewed mothers in 
1954 during the week after consent forms were sent back to their 
children’s school but before the start of  the trial, asking where 
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the mothers learned about the trial and why they decided to al-
low their children to participate in it or not.38 The study found 
that 41 percent of  mothers who gave consent had discussed the 
trial with a doctor or nurse; 61 percent had discussed the trial 
with friends, relatives, or neighbors; 15 percent had discussed the 
trial with school personnel; and 28 percent of  mothers discussed 
the trial with no one.39 Evidently, not only did less than half  of  
the mothers who gave consent talk with doctors about the trial, 
but most mothers were more likely to talk with their friends, rela-
tives, or neighbors instead. This finding is perhaps not surprising 
given the fact that the trial was conducted at schools rather than 
in hospitals or doctors’ offices. Conducting the trial in schools 
forced parents to have to seek out more legitimate information 
from their family physicians independently, which they would 
have done only if  they did not believe the information presented 
in the media and sent from the schools was adequate. In fact, 
almost 30 percent of  mothers who gave consent talked with no 
one, suggesting that almost a third of  consenting mothers were 
satisfied with what they read and heard from the media and from 
their children’s school.
 Orientation meetings conducted by each community’s 
department of  health did provide parents with additional infor-
mation and an opportunity to ask questions to medical authori-
ties. Indeed, the “Parent Attitudes Toward Participation” study 
found that “among parents who had initially been undecided, 
those who attended an orientation session at one of  the schools 
were significantly more likely subsequently to give consent than 
were parents who did not attend.” However, the meetings were 
led by health officials presumably supportive of  the trial and were 
held in public settings and in large groups, which perhaps pro-
hibited some parents from asking questions because they were 
less inclined or comfortable to do so in such a setting. Moreover, 
the group setting most likely influenced some parents to par-
ticipate through the “bandwagon effect.”40 Orientation meetings 
also prohibited a more personalized discussion of  how a parent’s 
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child would be affected by participating in the trial. Thus, it is 
worth noting that only one-third of  parents who gave consent 
attended these orientation meetings. 
 The carrying out of  Salk’s field trial in schools rather 
than in clinical settings compromised the degree to which par-
ents were able to make informed decisions as to whether to allow 
their children to participate in the trial. The information they 
received was primarily from the media, the NFIP, and schools, 
which did not fully capture the experimental nature of  the field 
trial. In this way, the lack of  unbiased and complete information 
made the trial appear as more of  a mass vaccination campaign 
than as a mass human experiment.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS AS ENGENDERING
OBLIGATORY PARTICIPATION
 The use of  public schools as loci for the trial also trans-
formed the act of  participating into a community deed or obliga-
tion. That is, the trial became perceived as a community event in 
which all members of  the public came together and played their 
part in fighting against a childhood disease. Polio in particular 
brought communities together, perhaps more so than any other 
disease of  the time; not only did the disease disproportionately 
affect young children and was potentially deadly, but it also rav-
aged the United States at a time of  intense nationalism. This 
perception of  the trial, which public schools had a hand in gen-
erating, had the effect of  subtly coercing families to participate. 
 The celebration and spectacle that coincided with the tri-
al contributed to the perception that participating in the trial was 
a communal or nationalistic act. Historian Jane Smith discusses 
how children and parents lined up in schools and were given the 
vaccine (or the placebo) one by one, as the media took pictures 
and onlookers smiled in wonder:
Whether the clinics were set up in the auditorium, class-
74     Will Schupmann
Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation
room, gym, or on the open lawn, the photographers 
took the same pictures: the line of  children waiting to 
get their shots; the wide-eyed little cowboy sandwiched 
between a nurse who held his shoulders and a doctor 
who pricked his arm; the brave little girl who grinned at 
the needle; and then the group of  proud survivors, broad 
smiles stretching the cheeks that still glistened with tears, 
each right hand pointing to the left upper arm to show 
where the magic shot had been given.41
In many ways, participating in the trial could be considered as 
a display of  solidarity with one’s community, since people were 
literally standing in line together to play a role in finding a cure to 
polio. The intense nationalism of  the epoch also caused mem-
bers of  the public to view participating in the trial as an obli-
gation for the nation’s wellbeing; just as individuals were called 
upon to shoulder their part in the onerous war effort during the 
A teacher’s message for her students regarding 
their historic role in the fight against polio.
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Second World War nearly a decade earlier, individuals were now 
called upon to assume their part in the name of  scientific ad-
vancement.42 In an image now iconic of  the polio trial, a teacher 
stands in front of  her students next to a blackboard which has 
written on it: “Making History. We are among the first children 
ever to be given Polio shots. So we are really making History 
today. We are lucky.” This image suggests that the teacher as-
sumed that everyone in the class was participating in the trial. It 
also demonstrates how children were told that it was a privilege 
to participate in the trial—just as the consent form mailed home 
to parents was in fact a “request to participate form”—and that 
teachers perceived participating as a classroom responsibility to 
“make history.”43 Another iconic image used for propaganda 
purposes by the NFIP shows children who had already received 
the vaccine lined up with their “Polio Pioneer” certificates, which 
were produced and distributed by the NFIP. The image is anoth-
er demonstration of  how much community spirit participation 
in the trial involved.
 This idea of  partaking in the trial as a community effort 
is also not so subtly expressed in the media and from the NFIP. 
A number of  scholars have noted how the NFIP marketed par-
Children received the NFIP’s “Polio Pioneer” 
badges after participating in the trial.
76     Will Schupmann
Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation
ticipation as a moral deed; Basil O’Connor, President of  the 
NFIP, stated in his letter to parents that the success of  the trial 
depended on their cooperation.44 Furthermore, many newspaper 
and magazine articles emphasized the vast number of  volunteers 
who were coming together to help carry out the trials; the “No 
more polio after ’54?” article describes:
…country health officers, medical societies, mayors and 
selectmen, newspaper-radio-TV executives, the Founda-
tion’s 3,100 chapters, P.T.A.s [Parent-Teacher Associa-
tions], other civic and community groups—in fact, every 
agency that could educate or activate—were drawn into 
the program.
 In size and detailed planning—right down to 
trailers for the local theater and buses to take the children 
to the vaccine clinics—there’s never been anything quite 
like it before!45
Therefore, given how greatly the trial was marketed and perceived 
as a community event and a major contribution to the country’s 
scientific advancement, even though children were required to 
present signed consent forms, parents were “softly” coerced into 
participating as well. In other words, parents were influenced to 
participate not by force but by a pervasive sense of  obligation.
CONSENT: A PRODUCT OF PUBLIC
DECISION-MAKING
 Conducting the trial in a public space such as schools 
also caused the decision to participate to be the product of  pub-
lic, not private, decision-making. In other words, because the trial 
was so large and in such a public setting, entire communities were 
faced with the decision of  whether to participate. Consequently, 
parents were influenced by their neighbors, friends, and relatives, 
and it was publicly evident whose children ultimately did partake 
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in the trial and whose did not. In this sense, the public nature of  
the trial introduced an additional component of  soft coercion 
to participate, since parents knew that their decision would be 
known and judged by their community.
 As previously mentioned, the “Parent Attitudes Toward 
Participation” study discovered that parents talked with friends, 
family, and neighbors about participating in the trial more than 
discussing it with their physicians, which suggests that parents 
either were influenced by other parents or had influenced oth-
ers when making their own decisions. Furthermore, given that 
orientation meetings were formatted as large groups, parents 
had the opportunity to learn about the trial together and then 
decide whether to participate together. In fact, the “Parent At-
titudes Toward Participation” study also found that parents were 
greatly influenced by the news of  what counties around them 
were doing: in one county in Virginia, the authors write that “the 
uncertainty facing parents [was] markedly intensified by the fact 
that several other counties in the immediate area had planned to 
participate in the vaccine trials but, for reasons relating to the 
scheduling of  the trials, had decided to postpone them indefi-
nitely.”46 The opposite—being more likely to participate because 
others were participating—was surely the case as well. 
 It is also important to recall that, as aforementioned, 
mass vaccination campaigns had been historically carried out 
in public spaces such as schools, community centers, or other 
popular gathering places. For example, New York City health of-
ficials carried out an enormous smallpox vaccination campaign 
in 1947 in response to the presence of  a novel case in the city. 
As a result, about 6.35 million people were vaccinated, and about 
1.2 million of  them received their vaccinations at locations or-
ganized by community organizations or employers. Moreover, 
companies such as Eastman Kodak, Trans World Airlines, Union 
Carbide, and Wanamaker’s all brought in city health department 
physicians to vaccinate their employees, and the department 
store Lane Bryant offered to house clinics for the public.47 Giv-
78     Will Schupmann
Public Schools as Loci for Human Experimentation
en that the trial was conducted in schools—a similarly public 
space—this existing association between mass vaccination cam-
paigns and public spaces had the effect of  casting the polio field 
trial as more of  a mass vaccination campaign.
SCHOOLS AS LEGITIMIZERS OF THE FIELD TRIAL
 Lastly, a subtler but still significant effect of  conduct-
ing the field trial in public schools was that the authority inher-
ent in schools and school officials helped legitimize the trial and 
give parents reason to participate. As aforementioned, schools 
were spaces in which health behaviors were taught for the ben-
efit of  both parents and children. To reiterate, teachers were in-
structed to educate children and parents about how polio spread 
and what preventive measures were needed to be taken at home. 
In this way, schools espoused a certain degree of  authority in a 
child’s health, even though they were not spaces in which doctors 
practiced. Given this trend of  teachers acting as a tacit author-
ity in children’s health, when teachers disseminated leaflets and 
consent forms to children to take home to their parents, it is 
probable that parents were more inclined to participate in the 
trial because the trial’s information derived from teachers.
 Schools and school officials also acted as “gatekeep-
ers” of  participation in some instances, either supporting chil-
dren’s participation in the trial or preventing their participation 
altogether. For example, in describing how the NFIP selected 
towns and schools in which to carry out the trial, historian Ar-
nold Monto notes, “Preference was given to jurisdictions with 
well organized health services as well as to regions where there 
was expressed interest in participation, especially from school 
officials, since schools would be the point of  access to the chil-
dren.”48 On one hand, this statement affirms that some school 
officials expressed their interest in having the trial carried out in 
their schools. On the other hand though, Monto’s assertion indi-
cates that there were cases in which school officials did not want 
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This publication by Polio Prevention, Inc., which was most likely an 
organization lobbying against the polio vaccine, alerts readers that several 
school districts, most notably the Los Angeles public schools, decided not to 
participate in the field trial. Although the legitimacy of  this organization is 
unknown, in actuality, there were health officials worried about the safety of  
using the vaccine on a wide scale. Moreover, this publication demonstrates 
that school officials had a great deal of  power in influencing public opinion 
about the vaccine.
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their schools participating in the trial. For example, in response 
to the Cutter Incident of  April 1955, Colgrove writes, “Cancel-
lations occurred primarily in [New York City’s] Spanish-speaking 
communities, in which press coverage of  the incident had been 
highly critical, and in schools where the principal was either in-
different or hostile to the vaccine.”49 Regardless, in either case, 
school officials had a say in whether the trial was brought to their 
schools. Depending on what this decision was, parents of  chil-
dren in these schools not only were allowed or denied access to 
the vaccine, but they also most likely perceived their administra-
tors’ act of  either welcoming or preventing the trial from com-
ing to their school as an endorsement or a rejection of  the trial. 
In this way, the actions of  school administrators also influenced 
parents’ participation in the trial.
CONCLUSION
 The use of  public schools instead of  clinical settings 
as loci for the polio vaccine field trial in 1954 had a significant 
impact on how members of  the public perceived and under-
stood the nature of  the trial. First, carrying out the trial in public 
schools prevented parents from making a fully informed deci-
sion of  whether to allow their children to participate because 
parents lacked unambiguous, unbiased, and complete informa-
tion concerning the experimental nature of  the trial. Second, 
the use of  schools contributed to a sense of  communal and na-
tionalistic obligation to participate. Third, the public nature of  
these schools caused parents’ decisions to be a product of  pub-
lic rather than private decision-making, as they were influenced 
by friends and neighbors and their community at large. Finally, 
the authority schools held regarding children’s health—and in 
the community at large—legitimized the trial. For these reasons, 
the trial appeared more like a mass vaccination campaign than a 
large-scale vaccine experiment.
 The National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis most 
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likely chose public schools as loci for the trial because the civic 
institutions offered a conveniently reachable population that 
could receive subsequent check-ups in addition to second and 
third administrations of  the vaccine. Moreover, students in the 
first through third grades (approximately ages six through eight) 
were the most at-risk cohort of  the population to be infected 
with polio. Admittedly, the NFIP did not choose schools as a 
means to entice greater participation, but it is important to con-
sider the consequences of  carrying out such experimentation in 
this setting compared to other environments. For example, clini-
cal settings, both functionally and symbolically, served differ-
ent purposes and have different meanings than schools. Conse-
quently, clinical settings were more appropriate for ensuring that 
human experimentation was carried out in the most ethical way 
possible. Indeed, from an ethical perspective, schools fracture 
the doctor-patient relationship so crucial to medical decision-
making, as conversations with physicians normally aid patients 
in determining the risks and benefits of  participating in experi-
mentation. Schools, however, prevent this style of  privacy and 
personalization; in such a public setting, therefore, parents were 
unable to make a completely voluntary decision as to whether to 
allow their children to participate in the polio field trial. Without 
a doubt, understanding how public schools influenced the ethics 
of  the polio vaccine trial will contribute to our knowledge of  
research ethics and our medical practices in the future.
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The Emerging Storm
The Emerging Storm: 
Sir Percy Loraine and Anglo-Turkish 
Rapprochement, 1934-1935
Otto Kienitz
 In January 1934, a gentleman from northern England 
traced the historic route of  St. Paul the Apostle, only this time 
in the opposite direction—straight into the blinding rays of  the 
rising sun. The man travelled east aboard the Oriental Express, 
steaming from Vienna to Istanbul, and then onward across the 
Anatolian Plateau, which was flecked white by an early winter 
snow. He was bound for the new Turkish capital of  Ankara 
in central Anatolia. The man arrived at his destination on the 
morning of  January 30, 1934, greeted by a damp chill that settled 
between the alleyways on the steep slopes of  the old town.1 This 
man was Sir Percy Loraine of  Kirkharle, a fifty-four year old 
British ambassador who had ended his post in Egypt a year be-
fore and now was slated to take charge of  the British Embassy in 
Turkey. Still bitter from being assigned to the “wilds of  Anato-
lia,” he was in a sour mood when his compatriots met him at the 
railway station.2
 Ambassador Loraine ascended quickly through the ranks 
of  the British Foreign Service, building his diplomatic acumen 
as a young attaché at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and 
then as a more experienced diplomat, moving from Spain, Per-
sia, Greece, and Egypt, before packing his bags for Turkey. He 
won fame as an “Orientalist” for his cordial rapport with eastern 
strongmen like Reza Khan of  Iran (with whom he negotiated in 
Tehran as Head of  Mission in the mid-1920s). Loraine noted his 
affinity for working with certain despotic personalities in his dia-
ry: “I do understand them better than most people—and I know, 
too, that their affection once won, is a very charming thing.”3 A 
note from Loraine’s wife and the executors of  the diplomat’s 
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will contained the following posthumous praise for the British 
Ambassador from historian Sir Pierson Dixon: “[H]is conduct 
of  affairs was based on his belief  that it is ‘men’ that count—not 
machines—in the order of  human affairs; his achievements, his 
trials which were those of  his country, and how he set about 
overcoming them being the evidence as to the truth of  his be-
liefs.”4
 During his tenure in Ankara between 1934-1939, Am-
bassador Sir Percy Loraine was responsible for organizing a 
geopolitical rapprochement between Britain and the Republic 
of  Turkey. This historical study weaves the tale of  Sir Percy Lo-
raine’s personal diplomacy through the overarching narrative of  
European international relations. It prioritizes Britain’s imperial 
and geopolitical interests in the security of  the Mediterranean 
Basin as well as the territorial sovereignty of  the nascent Turk-
ish Republic. The mid-1930s were characterized by an anxious 
response on the part of  the status quo powers threatened by 
the fascist revisionism sprouting in Benito Mussolini’s Italy and 
Sir Percy Loraine, GCMG PC (November 5, 1880 – May 23, 1961)
Educated at Eton College and then later at New College, Oxford, Loraine 
served in the British Foreign Office for almost four decades, from 1904-1941.
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Adolf  Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Upon the backdrop of  interwar 
diplomatic history, this essay details Ambassador Loraine’s ex-
perience forming his first strong relationship with the Turkish 
government in 1934, the challenges he confronted while work-
ing between London and Ankara during the early years of  An-
glo-Turkish rapprochement, and the impact of  the burgeoning 
Anglo-Turkish relationship on the brewing storm of  European 
diplomatic history during 1935 and beyond.
THE BALKAN PACT AND THE ITALIAN MENACE
 The signing of  the defensive Balkan Pact between 
Greece, Romania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia on February 9, 1934, 
was the first alarm to the British signaling the change in geo-
politics in the Eastern Mediterranean. The coordination of  the 
Balkan Pact was a reaction to Italian Prime Minister Benito Mus-
solini’s exclusive Four Power Pact, proposed in 1933, in which 
Italy called for great power cooperation between Berlin, London, 
Paris, and Rome. The Balkan Pact was therefore designed as a 
regional counterweight to Great Power politics that kept the “de-
mands and interests of  the smaller states” in mind.5 Turkey took 
the lead in Balkan diplomacy to orchestrate a defensive “‘neutral-
ity’ bloc” against the carving of  the peninsula into spheres of  ex-
ternal influence.6 Because Ankara still remained at odds with the 
four Great Powers over a number of  territorial disputes, Turkish 
policy was “generally perceived as promoting the interests of  
the regional countries and diluting great power control in the 
Balkans,” as well as deterring a provocative Bulgarian collusion 
with Fascist Italy that could threaten the stability of  the Eastern 
Mediterranean.7 The multilateral agreement offered Turkey the 
support it desired to warn Bulgaria against pursuing revanchist 
policies in the Balkan Peninsula, buying time for Ankara to “or-
ganize a regional defense against Italy”—the larger and more 
menacing threat to the stability of  the Mediterranean Basin.8
 Ever since the conclusion of  the Mosul Crisis in 1926, 
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British attention and materiel in the region had been quietly 
dwindling.9 Suddenly the Balkan Pact, and the lacuna of  Bul-
garia’s exclusion from the defensive club, brought the question 
of  Turkish security (and thus the remilitarization of  the Turkish 
Straits) to the fore.10 As Ambassador Loraine noted in a tele-
graph dated May 6, 1934, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs Dr. Tevfik Rüstü Aras had reasoned, “If  nations rearmed, 
Turkey was entitled to behave as they. She would not accept dif-
ferent treatment.”11 Since Bulgaria was determined to rearm its 
military, Dr. Aras implied that the whole trend toward rearma-
ment required Turkey to revisit the status of  the demilitarized 
Turkish Straits. British Secretary of  State for Foreign Affairs Sir 
John Simon, however, retorted that this would make “a most 
unpleasant impression.”12
 The French and Italian Ambassadors to Turkey were 
similarly alarmed, and urged the Great Powers to stand together 
against Turkish revisionism. As aforementioned, the Turks were 
concerned primarily with the collusion between Italy and Bul-
garia. Mussolini’s government was providing arms to the Bul-
garians, and the Turkish government interpreted this develop-
ment as a direct threat to the demilitarized zone in the region of  
Thrace along the Turco-Bulgarian frontier. The resident drago-
man James Morgan reported on the deliberations of  the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly of  June 1934.13 He described Turkish 
Interior Minister Sükrü Kaya’s speech in response to the threats 
posed against Turkey from the Mediterranean:
In the light of  events which have recently created a stir in 
Turkey, such as the speeches of  Signor Mussolini about 
possible Italian expansion in the East; increase of  Ital-
ian strength in the Dodecanese [Islands], and suspected 
Italian aid to Bulgaria, it is natural to connect the sudden 
decision to increase the credits for national defense with 
Turkey’s distrust and dislike of  Italy.14
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In front of  the Turkish Parliament, Kaya, simultaneously acting 
as Minister for Foreign Affairs while Dr. Aras was away tending 
to affairs at the League of  Nations in Geneva, referenced Musso-
lini’s speech from March 18 in which the Italian Premier extolled, 
“Expansion in Africa and Asia is the task for future generations 
of  Italians.”15 The Turkish public was unnerved by the rhetoric 
of  the fascist government in Italy and, as Ambassador Loraine 
wrote in his first Annual Report on Turkey, “It seems probable 
that Turkish Italophobia is exaggerated. It is, however, real…It is 
probable that mistrust of  Italy impelled Turkey toward a closer 
relation with the United Kingdom.”16 Loraine noticed that Ital-
ian aggression might lead Turkey to search for an ally among the 
Great Powers, particularly one with a strong navy and vested in-
terests in a peaceful Mediterranean Basin. Therefore, Mussolini’s 
bellicosity—and the timidity of  the Balkan Pact given the omis-
sion of  Albania—opened the door for a strategic Anglo-Turkish 
rapprochement. Consequently, the Ambassador moved quickly 
to present Britain as a viable partner to the Turkish Republic.
 No event is more telling of  Turkey’s drift toward rap-
prochement with Britain than Ambassador Loraine’s wild eve-
ning on June 17, 1934—a night he recounted to Secretary Simon 
in a long dispatch a few days later.17 After a banquet at the Ankara 
Palace Hotel, the Ambassador was playing bridge with his usual 
fastidiousness when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the President of  
Turkey, and two Persian generals (both of  whom Loraine knew 
well from his mission in Tehran) entered the room and invited 
the Ambassador to join their game of  poker. Loraine accepted 
the offer and was inundated with a game of  cards that crept on 
and on throughout the night, well past the morning light. He 
later remarked, “During these long hours The Gazi quite obvi-
ously cast down all barriers of  formality, and, without any loss 
of  dignity, treated me as though I were a personal friend and 
comrade.”18 Atatürk was an adept gambler, but chose to mix up 
the chips at the end of  the game so as to resolve any diplomatic 
differences. As the party left the table, Atatürk motioned for Lo-
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raine to stay behind.
 The President thoughtfully engaged the Ambassador 
over the night’s proceedings. Atatürk wished to know if  Loraine 
imagined the President’s antics as “fortuitous” or “deliberate” 
and the Ambassador responded politely, “His Excellency did 
not give me the impression of  a man who left many things to 
chance.” Atatürk smiled and acknowledged the “excellent im-
pression” the British Ambassador already made on the Turkish 
Government, as he saw Loraine’s appointment as a “measure of  
the friendly intentions of  His Majesty’s Government.” Loraine 
later pondered, “The Gazi said he had the greatest esteem for 
England and that he wished for friendship with England. Why 
could we not come closer together?” The Ambassador further 
mused, “It was not merely a question of  the Turkey of  today, 
but also of  the Turkey of  tomorrow…[and thus there was] no 
reason why England and Turkey should not be good friends.” 
However, Loraine realized that the sticking point between closer 
relations with Turkey was the country’s “most intimate friend…
Russia.” Aware of  this apprehensive sentiment maintained by 
Loraine, President Atatürk verbally reassured the British Ambas-
sador, indicating that “Turco-Russian intimacy” was no bar to 
Anglo-Turkish friendship. In response, the Ambassador replied, 
“If  the two friendships could coexist on open and parallel lines, 
then so much the better.” President Atatürk, visibly warmed by 
this exchange, reemphasized his wish for closer relations be-
tween Turkey and Britain. Moreover, before the two men parted 
ways, Atatürk added “that if  England really desired this on her 
part, he would want us to make some unmistakable sign to that 
effect.” Evidently, Atatürk’s sentiments were genuine, since the 
following evening Loraine was invited once again to The Gazi’s 
poker table, this time sitting with the Shah of  Persia and the 
Prime Minister of  Turkey Ismet Inönü. When the Ambassador 
and the President were the last two on the draw, Atatürk leaned 
over and exclaimed, “You see what our strength is when we are 
playing against each other! Imagine what it would be if  we were 
Penn History Review     93 
The Emerging Storm
united!”19
 Eventually, these nightlong marathons became part of  
the living legend of  Ambassador Loraine’s skillful tête-à-tête di-
plomacy on behalf  of  the British Crown, but the mystique tied 
to these accounts does not diminish the real diplomatic efforts 
to which they were inexorably tied. According to Ambassador 
Loraine’s biographer, historian Gordon Waterfield, “Each eve-
ning one of  the hotel clerks would send a list of  those present 
in the supper-room across to the President’s house at Cankaya, 
and he would then make his way to the Hotel if  there was anyone 
he wanted to see.”20 One of  President Atatürk’s modern biogra-
phers, historian Andrew Mango, observed:
The Gazi was the fount of  new ideas and the arbiter of  
disputes: careers were made and unmade round his table. 
In one of  his many stories about his parties, he ask[ed] 
one of  his guests, ‘Tell me what goes best with raki?’ 
‘Roasted chick peas (leblebi),’ the guest replie[d], know-
ing the host’s frugal tastes. ‘Wrong,’ [responded] Mustafa 
Kemal, ‘the best accompaniment to raki is good conver-
sation.’21
Such events offered Loraine an intimate platform to access the 
President’s personal perspectives on the trajectory of  Turkish 
foreign policy. However, Atatürk represented only one side of  
the Anglo-Turkish dialogue. Ambassador Loraine always acted 
upon what he as a professional diplomat considered to be Brit-
ain’s best interests, but the Ambassador was also tied to the policy 
directives of  His Majesty’s Government, and, more specifically, 
to the designs of  the Secretary of  State in London. Tensions 
often arose between London and the British Embassy in Ankara 
regarding what form the burgeoning Anglo-Turkish rapproche-
ment should take. One such endeavor was to bring British eco-
nomic policy up to speed in an attempt to overtake the privileged 
(but waning) economic relationship harbored by the Soviets in 
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the Turkish Republic in the early 1930s.
THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY
 While Loraine was still posted in Cairo as British High 
Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan between 1929 and 1933, 
the Soviet Union orchestrated three high-level state visits with 
Turkey that represented the zenith of  Turco-Soviet cooperation 
in the interwar period.22 Historian Samuel Hirst posits that the ties 
between the two Black Sea neighbors encompassed much more 
than just strong bilateral economic relations: the exchange of  en-
gineers, machinery, and long-term economic plans was matched 
by parallel commitments to secularization and the development 
of  cultural ties, including musical and “cinematographic collabo-
ration.”23 Alternatively, some historians frame the Turco-Soviet 
understanding in terms of  self-styled anti-Westernism grounded 
in the two regional powers’ geo-historical relegation to the Eu-
ropean periphery.24 Nevertheless, the most recognizable feature 
of  this relationship was Soviet economic assistance to the bur-
geoning Turkish Republic. For example, in 1932, the Soviets sold 
eight million dollars in industrial equipment to Turkey with a 
twenty-year interest-free repayment schedule.25 By the time Am-
bassador Loraine arrived to Turkey, the Turco-Soviet relation-
ship had produced a Turco-Soviet Commercial Treaty in 1931, 
bankrolled the first Turkish Five-Year Development Plan that 
was implemented in April 1934, and provided funds to construct 
textile mills at Kaygeri and Eregli in central Anatolia. Atatürk’s 
new policy of  state-led economic growth (etatism) prospered 
with the support of  the Soviet economy, which was one of  the 
few developing economies not to suffer deleterious shocks from 
the World Economic Crisis in 1929-1930 (though the Soviet’s 
socialist economy was well-beleaguered by 1934). However, the 
Turkish economy was heavily lopsided, with the bulk of  produc-
tion remaining tied to agriculture. The industrial plan, revolving 
around state-run holding companies such as Etibank (mining) 
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and Sumerbank (manufacturing), only mobilized about 15% of  
Turkish gross national product throughout the 1930s.26
 Soviet economic support was waning by the end of  1934, 
just as major geopolitical events turned Turkish eyes from the 
Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Ultimately, the same forces 
that lured Turkey away from the Soviet Union pushed the coun-
try toward Britain. As Hirst notes, an internal report from the 
People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated May 28, 1935, 
definitively cited that “divergent interpretations of  international 
politics threatened the [Turco-Soviet] partnership.”27 While the 
Soviet Union assumed that Nazi Germany was the principal 
threat to Europe, Turkey was more perturbed by its geopolitical 
rival in the Mediterranean Basin: Fascist Italy.
 However, while the geopolitics of  Europe were pushing 
the Turks toward the British, the etatist policies of  Turkish Minis-
ter of  Economics Celal Bayar frustrated British economists and 
precluded any further agreements from being secured. By mid-
1934, Ambassador Loraine was immersed in telegrams to and 
from Colonel Harold Woods in the Department of  Overseas 
Trade. British merchants were still operating under the Anglo-
Turkish Treaty of  Commerce and Navigation (1930), but Turkey 
began reneging on the agreement’s “most-favored nation” clause 
to set quotas and to hike up tariffs on British imports. The impe-
tus for these actions was Turkey’s negative balance of  payments 
with Britain. The Turkish government turned to a method of  
economic manipulation to arrange clearing and compensation 
agreements from its trading partners to create an “abnormal de-
mand from clearing countries for Turkish produce in order to 
free their frozen credits.”28 Because the British refused to acqui-
esce to Turkish pressures, British merchants were excluded from 
Turkish government contracts. “The outlook for the future is 
not encouraging,” wrote Loraine in the British Embassy’s An-
nual Report on Turkey for 1934.29 Therefore, one of  Loraine’s 
principal duties was to find a way to liberalize trade with the 
Turks without having to sign a humiliating clearing agreement.30
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 In March 1934, Ambassador Loraine invoked the pos-
sibility of  manipulating the British Mandate of  Palestine for ad-
ditional leverage on the Turkish economy: “The present posi-
tion is that Palestine is buying £1,000,000 worth of  stuff  from 
Turkey and is selling here about £40,000 worth”—amounting a 
significant trade imbalance that, if  ameliorated, could right the 
scales of  Turkish commercial policy to make way for more Brit-
ish exports.31 Loraine qualified his strategy to the Board of  Trade 
in London, warning, “We had better be cautious about waving 
big sticks at the Turks,” and suggesting, “We had better keep the 
possible Palestine card up [our] sleeve.”32
 Only a few months into his diplomatic tenure in Turkey, 
Loraine was already digesting Turkish public opinion and deflat-
ing the tensions that struck discord between Ankara and Lon-
don. “They are not being malicious about it but are overwhelm-
ingly impressed with the necessity of  protecting their interests,” 
the Ambassador wrote.33 Eventually, between Loraine’s diplo-
matic efforts and the work of  Colonel Woods in London, Britain 
signed a Trade and Payments Agreement with Turkey over a year 
later in June 1935, though the eventual agreement (replete with 
tariff  concessions) was constructed heavily in Turkey’s favor and 
was largely regarded as a “sacrifice” made by Britain to win favor 
in the Turkish Republic for increased diplomatic cooperation.34 
Clearly, further economic engagement proved to be the antici-
pated “sign of  support” President Atatürk had beseeched from 
the Ambassador over their game of  cards in June 1934; a year 
afterward, Loraine finally delivered the goods.
 Loraine’s Annual Report on Turkey for 1934 offers 
an overview of  British perspectives on Turkish foreign policy 
substantiating the sliver of  opportunity for Anglo-Turkish rap-
prochement. Ambassador Loraine remarked specifically on Tur-
key’s “decided coolness toward Italy,” “longstanding and tried 
friendship with Russia,” “mutual commercial advantage” with 
Nazi Germany, and unmistakable “increase in friendliness” with 
Britain.35 Nonetheless, Turkish relations with His Majesty’s Gov-
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ernment remained stricken by both countries’ frustrating com-
mercial policies; the “unfortunate” shooting incident of  a British 
naval offer; and the looming nationalization of  the Anglo-French 
Constantinople Quay Company that plagued economic relations 
throughout much of  the 1930s. Part of  the debate regarding the 
Constantinople Quay Company was a fissure between the Bank 
of  England and the British Treasury. According to Turkish his-
torian Mika Suonpää, “The Bank [of  England] unsuccessfully 
opposed all commercial agreements with Turkey, and its officials 
used the problems created by the Quays Company’s nationaliza-
tion, Turkish economic policy more widely, and the country’s 
dismal debt history to argue that Britain should not pursue closer 
financial ties with Turkey.”36
 Nonetheless, politicians in London remained interested 
in building closer political ties with Turkey, therefore gener-
ally ignoring the concerns expressed by the Bank of  England. 
His Majesty’s Government used political loans (i.e. commercial 
agreements and export credits) as “part of  the strategy securing 
Turkey’s collaboration in maintaining the military and political 
stability in the Mediterranean, Eastern Europe, and beyond.”37 
Britain was still far removed from this reality by the end of  1934, 
but Ambassador Loraine was committed to seeing this relation-
ship develop further. He watched a fresh snowfall blanket An-
kara on New Year’s Day of  1935. A little over a week later, Lo-
raine was bound for Istanbul on a warmed train, crossing the 
Anatolian highlands in pursuit of  the latest news from London.
SEARCHING FOR A MEDITERRANEAN RESPONSE
 Turkey’s diplomatic service was alert to the growing real-
ity of  Italian militarism. Turkish historian Dilek Barlas provides 
the translation of  a Turkish Foreign Ministry document from 
October 1934, which warned of  impending Italian military ac-
tion in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) “as soon as favorable domestic and 
international conditions emerged.”38 Loraine was more skepti-
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cal of  Mussolini’s territorial ambitions in Africa, contending, 
“The Turks habitually exaggerated this danger.”39 Still, in spite 
of  Ambassador Loraine’s protestations, the death of  five Ital-
ian askaris (colonial soldiers) in the contested Walwal region in 
eastern Abyssinia prompted retaliation from Rome on February 
10, 1935. Mussolini mobilized two Italian divisions and ordered 
an increased military build-up in the surrounding Italian colonies 
of  Eritrea and Italian Somaliland—a blatant threat to the sover-
eignty of  Abyssinia and the maintenance of  the status quo in the 
region.
 It was in 1935 that Anglo-Turkish relations began to pick 
up steam in response to the changing geopolitical landscape in 
the Eastern Mediterranean and the increasing importance of  
the League of  Nations in stymieing Italian aggression. At the 
same time, Ambassador Loraine’s foresight was muddled by the 
dual track diplomacy unfolding in Geneva and Ankara. Foreign 
Minister Dr. Aras was in Geneva negotiating sanctions to be 
imposed on the Italians over the crisis in Abyssinia, arbitrating 
alongside Sir Samuel Hoare and Anthony Eden, both of  whom 
served as Britain’s Secretary of  State for Foreign Affairs in late 
1935. Ambassador Loraine complained to London in Decem-
ber about this divergence: “Would it be possible to improve 
and speed up the machinery for keeping British representatives 
abroad informed of  what passes at Geneva[?]…What concerns 
me is the time lag.”40 The British Ambassador was acting in a 
precarious, time-sensitive environment. The most recent infor-
mation from the League of  Nations was critical to maintaining 
the British position in Ankara. Though the Turks wished for an 
inclusive Mediterranean security arrangement with the British 
Navy as its keystone, President Atatürk was also using Italian 
aggression to call for the remilitarization of  the Turkish Straits—
this time with increased tact due to the direct threat of  Italian re-
fortification of  the Dodecanese Islands off  the coast of  western 
Anatolia. His Majesty’s Government adamantly opposed Turkish 
remilitarization of  the Straits—still dictated by the disarmament 
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clauses within the Treaties of  Lausanne (1923) and of  Locarno 
(1925)— thus placing the British in an uncomfortable position: 
Britain was interested in tightening relations with the Turks, but 
preferred not to yield to Atatürk’s primary request.41 Loraine was 
caught between these two forces, charged with spanning the gap 
that fluctuated between official and unofficial opinion in London 
and Ankara.
 On November 25, 1935, Ambassador Loraine spoke with 
the Turkish Foreign Minister about the possibilities of  Anglo-
Turkish rapprochement, and sent an evaluation of  the responses 
of  Dr. Aras to Secretary Hoare in London:
Turkey’s interests in the Mediterranean are as identical as 
they could possibly be with those of  the United King-
dom; that any diminution of  British naval influence in 
the Mediterranean would be a calamity for Turkey; that 
any Mediterranean settlement which did not take Turkish 
interests into account would be viewed by Turkey with 
alarm and dismay; that Turkey looks to the United King-
dom as the only possibly effective champion of  peace 
and security in the Mediterranean, and hencethereforth 
[sic] of  Turkish national security interests in those waters; 
that the most disastrous result for Turkey would be the 
conversion of  the Mediterranean into a Latin lake; that 
Turkey in this matter, in view of  the convincing proofs 
she has given of  her entirely pacific and peace-making 
policies, is justified in looking to the United Kingdom to 
safeguard her interests in the Mediterranean, convinced 
that the United Kingdom in doing so will be serving her 
own wider interests no less well than those of  Turkey, 
however minor her interests may appear by comparison 
with ours.42
Dr. Aras made it clear to Loraine that Turkish opinion strongly 
favored an immediate resolution of  the Italo-Abyssinian crisis, 
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followed by a Mediterranean security pact. However, as Turkish 
historian Dilek Barlas notes, “Britain alone could not restrain the 
ever-growing Italian power and threat to the region.”43 Instead, 
Turkey called for an inclusive five-power pact, which included 
France, Britain, Greece, Italy, and Turkey, to provide for the sta-
bility of  the entire Mediterranean. This proposition was thwart-
ed quickly by disagreements among all of  the powers involved. 
In particular, France and Britain were “reluctant to assume such 
roles in the Mediterranean” once news of  Nazi Germany’s rear-
mament spread across Western Europe in 1935. Still, the Turks 
remained convinced that pulling Italy into a wide coalition would 
prove more effective than simply balancing Italian aggression 
vis-à-vis an alliance with another great power—namely Britain.44 
Turkey was not yet willing to abandon the hope of  a multilat-
eral agreement, and Britain was not yet willing to give Ankara 
the assurances that some, including Loraine, thought the Turks 
deserved. This was the geostrategic impasse on which questions 
of  the Turkish Straits became more divisive in 1936. For the 
time being, as Ambassador Loraine noted in his Annual Report 
on Turkey for 1935, “In view of  the increasing gravity of  the 
dispute between Italy and the League of  Nations, and of  the 
ensuing friendly collaboration of  His Majesty’s Government and 
Turkey, the Turkish Government, without abandoning their pur-
pose, were content to let the question of  the Straits sleep until a 
more propitious day should dawn.”45
 Italian mobilization in Abyssinia and the construction of  
airfields on the Dodecanese Islands motivated the Turks to re-
evaluate their own navy and air force in 1935. In April, Dr. Aras 
stressed Turkey’s drastic need for an updated surface navy: “It 
[is] the fleet…which in the last resort decide[s] wars…on sea a 
fleet [has] the last word.”46 While the British were enthusiastic 
toward a naval counterweight to Italy in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, they also had an international reputation to uphold as the 
“champions of  world wide disarmament.”47 Therefore, Britain 
was forced to tread a thin and hypocritical line governing Tur-
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key’s rearmament that would not go so far as to invoke questions 
of  remilitarizing the Straits. Barlas and fellow Turkish historian 
Serhat Güvenç draw attention to a British Foreign Office docu-
ment from November 1934 that expressed concern that “The 
prospect of  a race between Italy and her nervous little neighbors 
conducted on borrowed money [would be] a nightmare.”48
 Turkey, looking to buy naval armaments from the lowest 
bidder, signed a contract with Nazi Germany to buy four sub-
marines between 1936 and 1937.49 Britain was already alarmed by 
Nazi Germany’s large economic foothold in Turkey, and politi-
cians in London moved swiftly to keep Turkey out of  Hitler’s 
orbit, a strategy that was billed as a geostrategic check to Nazi 
German encroachment in the vulnerable Balkan Peninsula.50 To 
prevent Nazi Germany’s strong economic ties with Turkey from 
turning into direct political influence, the British Admiralty in-
creased its sensitivities for the Turkish Navy, exchanging fleet 
inspections and synchronizing naval cooperation over the ensu-
ing years. 
 The British Government’s attempts to bolster the Turkish 
Air Force were also impeded by strained economic relations. By 
mistake, the Turkish General Staff  learned that Britain recently 
had sold a number of  warplanes to Yugoslavia. Subsequently, the 
Turks wished to issue an order for themselves. However, when 
the Turkish General Staff  requested to buy one million pounds 
in British aircraft, commercial negotiations once again under-
mined the transaction and both parties were forced to settle for a 
reduced number of  aircraft that satisfied the conservative agenda 
of  the bankers in London.51 Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 
1935 was thus still held back by the lethargy of  British com-
mercial policy. Britain was not interested in increasing trade with 
Turkey—British firms could buy cheaper raw materials from 
British colonies abroad—and London’s policy of  maintaining a 
favorable balance of  trade was rejected outright by the Turkish 
government. Thus, even in terms of  geopolitical security, Britain 
“could not put the rapprochement between the two countries 
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onto sound economic foundations,” a fact that shouldered even 
more responsibility onto Ambassador Loraine.52
 What Loraine did manage to accomplish in 1935 was the 
realization of  an informal multilateral Mediterranean security 
pact that worked both in and around the League of  Nations. 
The alliance grouped Britain, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia to-
gether in a “Gentlemen’s Agreement” that imposed sanctions on 
Italy via the League of  Nations’ Committee of  Eighteen, guar-
anteeing each other mutual support in the case of  further Ital-
ian aggression.53 The Italian Ambassador to Turkey was alarmed 
by Turkey’s blatant alignment with Britain and outwardly criti-
cized this reactionary measure. The Turkish Foreign Ministry 
responded by making clear that Turkey was simply obliging its 
commitments to the League of  Nations, “which were no secret 
at all.”54 Fortuitously, the French acquiesced to the British-led se-
curity agreement in the Mediterranean, and with the conclusion 
of  the Franco-Soviet Pact, in addition to the extension of  the 
Turco-Soviet Protocol in 1935, Turkey’s strategic defense was 
secured within a constellation of  advantageous relationships. 
Admittedly, the weakness within this multilateral “Gentlemen’s 
Agreement” was the attitude of  France and Britain toward Italy. 
The Great Powers still hoped to divert a potential conflict by 
appeasing Mussolini and deflating Italian revisionism through 
diplomatic engagement. The tension between an explicit Medi-
terranean Pact that targeted Italy (the Turkish position) and an 
implicit understanding that would include Italy in maintaining 
the status quo (the British position) was a crucial consideration 
in the development of  Anglo-Turkish relations.
 Therefore, by the end of  1935, Britain was facing a stra-
tegic impasse highlighted by the divergent directives coming out 
of  London. The Foreign Office reflected the gloomy views of  
Secretary Eden and his advisors, mainly “that [Mussolini] would 
be compelled to launch fresh adventures and end [up] as Hit-
ler’s satellite.55 These attitudes were doubly opposed by Britain’s 
conservative press and military, which held that Mussolini would 
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“soon revert to his former role of  ‘good European.’”56 There-
fore, while the Foreign Office continued to pursue an alliance 
bloc—advocating defensive agreements with Greece and Tur-
key—the joint command of  the British military was reluctant 
to acknowledge any action that might alienate Rome. Admiral 
Ernle Chatfield argued that Britain’s support of  sanctions from 
the League of  Nations and London’s trust in collective security 
“have got us into this quarrel with Italy,” putting undue stress 
on Britain’s imperial responsibilities, which was an “intolerable 
strain on the navy’s resources and [an] unacceptable risk of  
war.”57 Historian Reynolds Salerno provides that “Britain’s lack 
of  adequate naval bases and weak military strength in the eastern 
Mediterranean would require the British to be on the defensive 
if  Italy became hostile, regardless of  the number of  British allies 
there.”58
 Britain’s tender relations with Italy were compounded by 
Turkish President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (left), His Majesty 
King Edward VIII of  the United Kingdom (center), and 
British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine (right) meet aboard 
Atatürk’s personal yacht in Istanbul, Turkey, 
on September 5, 1936.
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two maxims of  strategic thinking. First, His Majesty’s Govern-
ment took for granted that a hostile Italy made a general Euro-
pean war more likely and dangerous. Second, British imperial de-
fense doctrine specified three major geostrategic commitments: 
“the defense of  the Far East, the defense of  India, and obliga-
tions in Western Europe arising from the Locarno Pact.”59 An 
aggressive Italy subverted Britain’s strategic unity. By extending 
influence into the Eastern Mediterranean as far as the Dodeca-
nese Islands, Italy could simultaneously threaten the Suez Canal 
in Egypt; jeopardize British land and air routes to the Indian 
Raj (through Egypt, Palestine, and Iraq); destabilize the Balkan 
Peninsula by supporting Bulgarian revanchism and Nazi Ger-
man designs on Southeastern Europe; and—in the event of  
Japanese pugnacity in the Far East—unbalance the distribution 
of  the British naval fleet by prompting a “stab in the back from 
Mussolini” if  Britain deployed its forces elsewhere.60 First Lord 
of  the Admiralty Winston Churchill was one of  the few British 
statesmen to understand the threats posed in Southeastern Eu-
rope. He maintained that Britain and France must bring Turkey 
into the war to support Romania in the Balkan Peninsula, gain 
control of  the Black Sea, and seal the Mediterranean Basin to 
prevent the Nazis from “solv[ing] their problems of  food and oil 
supply and thus to defeat the Allies’ long-war strategy.”61
 While Winston Churchill articulated this opinion in 1939 
in the face of  war, the strategic calculus of  the British navy in 
the Eastern Mediterranean can be traced back to the origins of  
Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in 1934-1935. Keeping this ap-
proach in mind, it is no coincidence that Permanent Under-Sec-
retary of  State for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan would 
identify Turkey as the “lynch-pin” of  the entire Eastern Mediter-
ranean.62 With Fascist Italy orchestrating espionage campaigns in 
Morocco and Malta, riling Macedonian and Croat nationalism in 
Yugoslavia, subsidizing and producing anti-British propaganda 
in Egypt and Palestine, amassing a sizable military force in Libya, 
and claiming Mussolini as the “Protector of  Islam” in the Middle 
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East, a pro-British Turkish Republic was vital to stymie the score 
of  Italian hostilities across the Mediterranean Basin.63 Neverthe-
less, as the calendar turned from 1935 to 1936, Ambassador Lo-
raine was still struggling with the Foreign Office to see eye-to-
eye with the Turks in Ankara, particularly over the disagreements 
at the League of  Nations in Geneva concerning the status of  the 
Turkish Straits in the face of  the burgeoning threat to peace on 
the European continent.
IMPLICATIONS OF ANGLO-TURKISH
RAPPROCHEMENT
  At a dinner party in the summer of  1937, Loraine im-
parted to his guests: “The duty of  the diplomat is not so much 
to avert war at any price, as to ensure that, if  war is inevitable, his 
country will at least have the right allies. It takes many years of  
persevering peace-time effort to accomplish as much.”64 Keep-
ing the Ambassador’s judicious words in mind, the study of  dip-
lomatic history during peacetime can be just as illuminating as 
the study of  diplomatic discontinuities during times of  war. The 
story of  Anglo-Turkish rapprochement contains both. While 
Turkey tried to entrench Anglo-Turkish relations in an explicit 
multilateral Mediterranean Pact multiple times between 1934 
and 1939, Britain hoped that an implicit understanding of  their 
advantageous relationship would give British (and Turkish) poli-
cymakers more flexibility to pursue divergent diplomatic goals 
while fostering stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Brit-
ish thus delayed the signing of  any substantial written agreement 
with Turkey, preferring to appease the Italians and the Nazis in-
stead. The British strategy of  appeasement in the Mediterranean 
Basin finally fell apart in the face of  Italy’s invasion of  Albania in 
April 1939. Therefore, by the time of  the signing of  the Anglo-
French-Turkish Treaty of  Mutual Assistance in October 1939, 
the European state system had already begun to unravel past the 
point of  no return. The explicit multilateral security pact Turkey 
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sought out in 1935 was useless by 1939, and the Turkish Re-
public had no other choice but to declare neutrality during the 
Second World War (1939-1945).
 Before 1939, an alliance with Turkey provided Britain a 
key agent in Southeastern Europe, theoretically making it pos-
sible to deter and protect the Balkan Peninsula from Italian and 
Nazi German aggression. Some scholars have admonished Brit-
ain and the other Western Allied Powers—including France and 
the United States of  America—for the ‘abandonment’ and ‘be-
trayal’ of  Southern and Eastern Europe, not at the Yalta Confer-
ence in February 1945, but earlier at the Munich Conference in 
September 1938, shaming the Allied Powers for turning away 
from the small nations of  Europe.65 However, such an assess-
ment is more complicated if  one evaluates the Anglo-Turkish 
Mutual Aid Agreement of  May 12, 1938 as a defensive corol-
lary for the region that established an Anglo-Turkish bulwark in 
the Balkan Peninsula months before the Munich Agreement was 
signed on September 30, 1938. Given the enthusiastic rhetoric 
of  Anglo-Turkish rapprochement on both sides, and London’s 
surprise at Ankara’s decision to shrink before its treaty duties in 
1939, it can be argued that Britain invested real strategic value in 
Turkey as a guarantor of  Allied security in the Balkan Peninsula, 
both before and after the Munich Conference.
 Without completely turning toward counterfactual his-
tory, the fate of  Southeastern Europe may not have been sealed 
at the Munich Conference in September 1938, but, in actuality, 
signed away in Moscow with the German-Soviet (Molotov-Rib-
bentrop) Non-aggression Pact on August 23, 1939. The Soviet 
‘betrayal’ of  the Allied Powers did not just erase Poland from the 
map: the agreement effectively compromised Turkey’s eastern 
flank and undermined the country’s ability to act freely in align-
ment with Britain and France. When the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact was exposed, Britain’s most important ally in the region—
the Turkish Republic—was geopolitically compromised and sub-
sequently pressured to bow out of  the Anglo-French-Turkish 
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Treaty of  1939 and retire into neutrality in 1940. Returning to 
the details of  Loraine’s game of  cards on June 17, 1934, the span 
of  Anglo-Turkish relations was augured by President Atatürk’s 
assessment that Turkey would maintain “open and parallel… 
friendships” with Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain’s bet on 
the Turkish Republic in 1934 was spoiled by the Soviets’ gamble 
on Nazi Germany in 1939.
 Therefore, Turkey’s role in Britain’s grand strategy should 
not be discounted, especially in terms of  the decision for further 
appeasement at the Munich Conference of  1938. The wishful 
thinking driving Anglo-Turkish rapprochement permeated the 
Allied Powers’ grand strategy, and the mythos of  the ‘abandon-
ment’ and ‘betrayal’ of  the small nations of  Europe should be 
measured against Britain’s reliance on Turkey’s cooperation and 
influence (including the Turkish Republic’s shared “views, inter-
ests, and principles”) in Southeastern Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean between the inception of  Anglo-Turkish rap-
His Majesty King Edward VIII of  the United Kingdom 
(center left) alongside Turkish President Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk (center right) in Istanbul in 1936. Their first meet-
ing was orchestrated by British Ambassador Sir Percy 
Loraine, indicating the success of  Anglo-Turkish 
rapprochement.
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prochement in 1934 and its subsequent collapse in 1939-1940.66 
Later, Loraine reflected on the legacy of  his diplomatic mission 
in Turkey:
[If  the observer needed] any proof…of  the efficacy of  
the British lines of  policy…shall we not find it in the fact 
that the Turkish Republic, many of  whose men fought 
against us in the last war, is now our friend and ally and 
has kept, at enormous sacrifice to the nation, an army 
of  one million men mobilized for three years to oppose 
any aggression on her sovereignty, her territory and her 
liberty.67
 In hindsight, Anglo-Turkish rapprochement was a dip-
lomatic achievement. Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine succeeded 
in turning a historical enemy into a benevolent bystander, due in 
part to what esteemed British diplomat Sir Pierson Dixon called, 
“the excellence of  [Ambassador Loraine’s] judgment—[which] 
might better be called the rarest of  all qualities: wisdom.”68 As 
one of  Loraine’s dinner guests in the summer of  1937 exclaimed, 
“If  the pendulum [of  Turkish policy] was now swinging over 
to friendship with Great Britain, it was because the unremitting 
efforts of  the Ambassador had set it in motion.”69 Nonetheless, 
the momentum of  Loraine’s lauded tenure in the Turkish capital 
could not keep Turkey from folding in the face of  war; for along-
side Anglo-Turkish rapprochement, like in any game of  poker or 
diplomacy, there were always other hands in play.
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“Indianizing the Confederacy”:
Understandings of War Cruelty 
During the American Civil War and 
the Sioux Uprising of 1862
Zachary Brown
Stanford University
 For much of  early American history, the general public’s 
racially charged preconceptions of  “Indian war,” defined by 
stereotypes of  guerrilla fighting and “savage” atrocities such as 
scalping, were central to how Americans understood the terrors 
of  war. Often forgotten today though, is the prominent role this 
fear played during the American Civil War (1861-1865). The fear 
of  Indian war allowed for clear, and often intentional, parallels 
to be discerned by onlookers between the reported natives’ 
atrocities of  the Dakota War (1862) in Minnesota (also known as 
the Sioux Uprising of  1862) and the concurrent American Civil 
War. The presence of  Native American combatants on Civil War 
battlefields resulted in the “indianizing” of  the Union’s enemy, 
which ranged from criticisms of  the Confederacy’s interest 
and success in recruiting and employing indigenous support to 
censures of  the tactics and morals maintained by the Confederate 
military and political leadership in all theatres of  the war. The 
Union’s rhetoric of  indianizing the Confederacy also helped to 
solidify the rumors of  southern agents encouraging the Sioux 
Uprising.
 This paper examines how the rhetoric of  indianizing 
the enemy influenced northerners’ understandings of  the Civil 
War and the Dakota War as well as the connections between 
these armed conflicts. By tying Indian war and its accompanying 
atrocities to Confederate policies, the northern press purposefully 
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connected the Dakota War to a pre-existing racial framework 
of  Indian-Confederate convergence that had, particularly in 
reaction to the Battle of  Pea Ridge (March 1862) in the Civil 
War, emerged earlier. Understanding the connections between 
these two wars of  rebellion provides insight into the psyche of  
northern civilians in 1862 and offers a unique perspective on the 
role of  Native Americans during the Civil War era.
INDIANIZING THE ENEMY BEFORE
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
 The rhetorical strategy of  comparing American enemies 
to the “savagery” of  indigenous populations has a long and 
controversial history as war propaganda dating back to the 
Colonial Period. During the American War of  Independence 
(1775-1783), revolutionary propagandists accused their British 
and Loyalist opponents of  enabling Indian “savagery”— 
particularly scalping. Similarly, Tories responded in kind. 
Immediately following the Battles of  Lexington and Concord 
(April 1775), British General Thomas Gage, then serving as 
the Royal Governor of  Massachusetts, published a broadside 
in Boston claiming that his forces had found three British 
“Soldiers on the Ground one of  them scalped, his Head much 
mangled, and his Ears cut off, tho’ not quite dead; a Sight which 
struck the Soldiers with horror.”1 The British publication Scots 
Magazine also responded to the incident by describing Americans 
through racial comparisons to Indian “savages.” The magazine 
declared that the Americans’ “humanity is written in the indelible 
characters with the blood of  the soldiers scalped and googed 
[sic] at Lexington.”2
 Another famous case is that of  Thomas ‘Burnfoot’ 
Brown. A Loyalist from Georgia, Brown refused to join the 
revolutionaries’ cause and, subsequently, was captured by 
the Sons of  Liberty. According to Brown’s testimony, he was 
“o’erpowered, stabbed in many places, my skull fractured 
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by a blow from a rifle, [and then] I was dragged in a state of  
insensibility to Augusta. My hair was then chiefly torn up by the 
roots; what remained stripped off  by knives; my head scalped 
in 3 or 4 different places; my legs tarred and burnt by lighted 
torches, from which I lost the use of  two of  my toes.”3 While 
the veracity of  this incident and other reported confrontations 
of  “barbarous” violence is suspect, these dramatic accounts 
gained popularity and prevalence in the press and demonstrated 
the extent to which both the British in the metropole and the 
Loyalists in North America used the racial rhetoric of  Indian war 
to demonize their American adversaries.
 While British media charged Americans with Indian 
savagery, most accusations of  barbarianism during the War of  
Independence came from the revolutionary polemic directed 
against the British. Arguably the most famous of  these rhetorical 
attacks was the tale of  Jane McCrea, the intended bride of  a 
Loyalist lieutenant, who was abducted by Indians allied with 
the British commander John Burgoyne, and then shot and 
scalped. In response to the news, General Horatio Gates of  
the Continental Army sent a letter denouncing Burgoyne to 
the Second Continental Congress and newspaper outlets in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, declaring:
That the savages of  America should…mangle and scalp…
[is not new]…that the famous lieut. Gen. Burgoyne…
should hire the Savages of  America to scalp Europeans 
and the descendants of  Europeans; nay more, that he 
should pay a price for each scalp so barbarously taken, is 
more than will be believed in Europe, until authenticated 
facts shall, in every Gazette, convince mankind of  the 
truth of  the horrid tale.4
Following its publication in Philadelphia, McCrea’s story spread 
quickly throughout the American Colonies and outraged 
colonists, inspiring greater support for independence. As a 
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result, pro-American newspapers began this trend to “indianize” 
the British. For example, in 1781, Philadelphia’s Freeman’s Journal 
wrote that British support of  Native Americans was evidence 
that they were “the same brutes and savages they were when 
Julius Caesar invaded … for it is certain their mixture with the 
Saxons and other foreigners, has done very little toward their 
civilization.”5 Employing racially charged language previously 
used exclusively against Native Americans, the American press 
during the War of  Independence denounced their British enemies 
as unredeemable savages who emulated, and even surpassed, the 
cruelty of  their Native American allies.
 Americans revived this form of  propaganda again 
during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), as proponents 
of  the war often likened Mexicans to Indian “savages” based on 
racist concepts of  “race-mixing” between the natives and the 
Spanish colonizers. For example, Senator Robert J. Walker of  
Mississippi claimed that “five sixths” of  Mexico’s population 
was of  “the mixed races, speaking more than twenty different 
languages, composed of  every poisonous compound of  blood 
and color…[and are] barbarous hordes.”6 Thus, when reports 
of  Indian violence under Confederate command reached 
northern civilians during the Civil War, the Union press revived 
the rhetorical strategy by associating Indian savagery to lambast 
Confederate forces.
THE BATTLE OF PEA RIDGE
AND INDIANIZING THE CONFEDERACY
 The most explosive incident of  Native American 
engagement in the main theaters of  the Civil War occurred in 
March 1862 at the Battle of  Pea Ridge, near Leetown on the 
northwest corner of  Arkansas. Pea Ridge was the first major battle 
to feature Indian troops, mostly Cherokee, under the command 
of  Confederate Brigadier General Albert Pike.7 Indeed, a majority 
of  the Cherokee people, one of  the five indigenous nations 
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known collectively as the Five Civilized Tribes, had allied with 
the Confederacy after meeting with a delegation led by Pike in 
the summer of  1861.8 Nonetheless, Pike, under orders of  Major 
Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price, was pessimistic about 
the native battalions he commanded. While Van Dorn favorably 
described Pike’s 2500 native soldiers as “half  breed Indians, and 
good reliable men,” the Brigadier General later claimed that the 
troops were “entirely undisciplined, mounted chiefly on ponies 
and armed very indifferently with common rifles and ordinary 
shotguns.”9
 Moreover, the militarily inexperienced Pike struggled to 
control his indigenous battalions once engaged in combat. After 
taking the Union position at Foster’s Farm during the Battle 
of  Pea Ridge, the First Cherokee Mounted Rifles routed two 
companies of  the Third Iowa Cavalry directed by Lieutenant-
Colonel Henry Trimble. Contrary to Pike’s desires, in the ensuing 
Plan of  the Battlefield of  Pea Ridge, near Leetown, Arkansas
120     Zachary Brown
Indianizing the Confederacy
chaos, the native troops scalped eight Union soldiers in Trimble’s 
detachment.10 Consequently, Colonel Cyrus Bussey, the chief  
commanding officer of  the Third Iowa Cavalry, informed his 
superior, Samuel R. Curtis, the commander of  the Army of  the 
Southwest:
[I] had the dead exhumed, and on personal examination…
found that it was a fact beyond dispute that eight of  the 
killed of  my command had been scalped…first having 
fallen in the charge…they were afterwards pierced 
through the heart and neck with knives by a savage and 
relentless foe.11
While the Union forces under Curtis recovered to win the 
Battle of  Pea Ridge, the incident at Foster’s Farm dominated 
in the press. Van Dorn tried to repress and excuse the incident, 
claiming through his Adjutant General Dabney H. Maury that 
Curtis was “misinformed with regard to this matter, the Indians 
who formed part of  [Pike’s] forces having for many years been 
regarded as civilized people.” Van Dorn also accused Union 
forces of  committing their own atrocities, primarily blaming 
Germans, the largest ethnic group employed by Union forces, 
thereby attempting to capitalize on Confederates’ attempts to 
revive anti-Hessian sentiment first harbored during the War of  
Independence.12 In particular, Van Dorn employed the racially 
charged accusation that captured Confederate soldiers had been 
“murdered in cold blood by their captors, who were alleged to be 
Germans.”13 However, despite Van Dorn’s allegations Pike felt 
compelled to write to Curtis personally, expressing horror at the 
atrocity, and chastised his troops accordingly, issuing an order 
prohibiting the practice of  scalping.14
 Despite Pike’s efforts to discipline his indigenous troops 
after the incident, the northern press lambasted the Brigadier 
General. In the aftermath of  Pea Ridge, anti-Confederate 
propaganda converged on Pike with the racially motivated 
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rhetoric of  Indian War. The most prominent source for this 
propaganda came from an article in the New-York Tribune written 
by journalist Junius Henri Browne.15 Browne’s melodramatic 
account of  the battle described Pike as a man “who deserves 
and will doubtless receive eternal infamy…for inducing savages 
to [perform] shocking barbarities…[ordering] scalping and 
robbing…their favorite pastimes…[for] they plundered every 
wounded, dying and dead Unionist they could find…[murdering 
those] incapable of  resistance.” Browne then emphasized, “the 
[Confederate] rebels did everything…to excite them into a 
frenzy giving them large quantities of  whiskey and gunpowder 
a few minutes previous to the commencement of  hostilities.”16 
In an editorial in the New-York Tribune a few days later, again 
Pike was described in terms that resemble a pejorative attack on 
indigenous warriors:
Pike [is a] ferocious fish…[who] got himself  up in 
good style, war-paint, nose-ring and all…[he] led the 
Aboriginal Corps of  Tomahawkers and Scalpers at the 
Battle of  Pea Ridge…was indicted for playing the part 
of  Squeers, and cruelly beating and starving a boy in his 
family. He escaped by some hocus-pocus of  a law and 
emigrated to the West, where the violence of  his nature 
has been admirably enhanced…[he] has fought duels 
enough to qualify…[as] a leader of  savages…[he is a] 
new Pontiac…and betaken himself  to the culture of  the 
Great Spirit…[or] Spirits—Whisky being the second. So 
much for Pike!17
The sensationalized detail afforded to descriptions of  Pike and 
accusations of  Indian treachery, however, were more likely an 
attempt to distract readers from the vagueness of  Browne’s 
account of  the actual fighting: 
Desperate but desultory; now here, now there, at one 
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Journalist Junius Henri Browne’s fraudulent map detailing the “positions” 
of  Union and Confederate forces at the Battle of  Pea Ridge
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moment on a hill, at the next in a ravine. Skirmishing 
was visible everywhere and hard hand-to-hand fighting 
in every quarter of  the field. Now advancing, now 
retreating were our forces; now marching forward, now 
countermarching; now appearing, now disappearing, but 
ever moving forward to victory.18
Indeed, in its specificities, Browne’s account of  the fighting 
was fictitious. The journalist’s description of  the Confederate 
position differed from those relayed by other war correspondents, 
including Browne’s main rival, Thomas Knox of  the New York 
Herald, who also claimed to be present at the Battle of  Pea Ridge. 
To be sure, unlike Knox’s account, Browne’s article featured a 
wildly inaccurate map on which he placed commanders in 
incorrect locations and claimed that the battle took place in an 
area four times as large as the actual battlefield. While Knox 
and fellow reporter William Fayel of  the Daily Missouri Democrat 
did verify Browne’s claim that scalping occurred—which was 
also later confirmed by Union military reports—there was no 
evidence or corroborating witness to substantiate Browne’s most 
extraordinary accusation: that Pike’s Indians also attacked and 
scalped their Confederate allies in the violent frenzy that followed 
the assault on the Third Iowa Cavalry. These inconsistencies, 
therefore, support the notion that Browne was not present at 
Pea Ridge and that the journalist’s account was propagandistic 
yellow journalism most likely mixed with facts, rumors, hearsay, 
and self-invented narratives to demonize the Confederates. Still, 
to the anxious northerners who read Browne’s article, Pike was 
no better than the savage natives he commanded, despite the 
fact that the Brigadier General discouraged scalping among his 
men.19 
 Meanwhile, Knox’s more accurate account of  the battle 
gained little traction among readers. It would take a month 
until the New York Herald even chastised Browne and the New-
York Tribune for deceiving the public through “imposture more 
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flagitious [than] is…conceivable.”20 But the resulting war of  
words between the New York Herald and the New-York Tribune 
produced only mild public outcry. In 1862, as a quick end to 
war appeared increasingly unlikely, anxious northerners were 
more concerned with demonizing their Confederate enemies 
than obtaining accurate accounts of  a battle in the distant Trans-
Mississippi Theater. In fact, by the time the fraudulence of  
Browne’s account was exposed, it was already being celebrated 
in Britain as a model of  war journalism and being praised by the 
influential editor of  the New-York Tribune, Horace Greeley, as a 
story that “should be placed in every National soldier’s hands.”21 
Thus, while this one incident conducted by the First Cherokee 
Mounted Rifles in the Trans-Mississippi Theater occurred far 
away from the primary focus of  the Civil War (the Eastern 
Theater), it is evident that the sensationalized journalism of  
Browne helped revive the rhetoric of  “savage” Indian violence 
as a way to describe Confederate enemies. Consequently, as the 
Dakota War began in the late summer of  1862, the reported 
horrors of  scalping at Pea Ridge was the enduring vision of  
Indian war maintained by many northerners, making the rumors 
of  a Confederate plot unfolding in Minnesota seem likely. 
THE DAKOTA WAR AND
THE STATE OF THE UNION IN 1862
 Caused by a host of  regional tensions between white 
settlers—food shortages, treaty violations, and the corruption 
of  government agencies regulating Native American affairs—
and exacerbated by the military and financial pressures of  the 
Civil War, the Dakota War in Minnesota was one of  the most 
significant Indian Wars of  the nineteenth century.22 The conflict 
launched a period of  nearly thirty years of  intermittent warfare 
between the United States and the Sioux, often referred to as the 
Sioux Wars, that did not end until “Siouxan independence came 
to its final, tragic end on a cold day in December, 1890, in the 
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Massacre at Wounded Knee.”23
 Despite its military and causal ties to the Civil War, most 
Americans regarded the Dakota War as a peripheral event in 
1862. Nevertheless, the Dakota War haunted northerners as a 
powerful symbol of  the disastrous setbacks that had plagued the 
Union war effort throughout the year. Decisive successes in the 
Western Theater, including at Pea Ridge and Shiloh, did little to 
assuage anxiety over the ensuing failures of  Union forces in the 
East. The most prominent of  these setbacks was the disastrous 
defeat at the Second Battle of  Bull Run in August at the hands 
of  General Robert E. Lee and the Army of  Northern Virginia. 
The Union defeat was so embarrassing that President Abraham 
Lincoln relieved the foremost Union commander, Major 
General John Pope, from his position and reassigned Pope to 
the Department of  the Northwest in Minnesota to command 
troops in the Dakota War. 
 Few Americans outside of  Minnesota saw the rebellion 
in the Dakota as a central concern or even understood the Sioux 
Uprising’s connections to the Civil War. However, the distant 
conflict emerged as an outlet for northerners to externalize their 
anxiety as the once unimaginable prospect of  Union military 
collapse seemed increasingly possible with the threat of  a 
Confederate and Indian western front. Northern anxiety about 
a Confederate and Indian alliance in the West, combined with 
reports of  atrocities from the Minnesota front, resulted in the 
revival of  the rhetoric of  Confederate-Indian convergence that 
had emerged following the Battle of  Pea Ridge. Deep-seated 
fears and stereotypes of  Indian war among northerners made 
it easy for Union magazines and newspapers to connect the 
Confederacy’s use of  “savage” Indian allies at Pea Ridge to the 
reports of  atrocities during the Dakota War.
INDIANIZING THE ENEMY IN THE DAKOTA WAR
 Reports of  violent atrocities committed by Native 
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Americans were common during the Dakota War. For example, 
on August 18, 1862, following a raid by natives on the Schwandt 
family, August Schwandt, recounted, “the daughter of  Mr. 
Schwandt [August’s sister, Karolina Schwandt Walz], enceinte 
[pregnant], was cut open, as was learned afterward, the child 
taken alive from the mother, and nailed to a tree...It struggled 
some time after the nails were driven through it!”24 Similarly, a 
female captive who was living with the Sioux observed, “A boy 
twelve years of  age, whose parents had probably been murdered, 
fretted and cried a good deal of  the time, saying he wanted to 
go home. The Indians killed him by cutting him into pieces, 
commencing at his feet and then cutting his legs into small 
chunks.”25 While the kind of  sensationalized violence typical of  
this literature reflected real anxieties of  white settlers and soldiers 
on the Minnesota frontier, these and similar reports should be 
read with skepticism. As Colonel Henry H. Sibley wrote to his 
wife Sarah, “Do not believe the thousand extravagant reports 
you hear. People are absolutely crazy with excitement and credit 
every absurdity.”26 Nevertheless, these accounts of  atrocities all 
featured grotesque violence and greatly exceeded the brutality 
of  common stereotypes of  Indian war, including scalping. But 
contrary to the popular perception of  Indian war at the time, 
white settlers and soldiers rarely reported scalping performed by 
Indians during the Dakota War.
 Ironically, Union troops and white settlers were 
responsible for the most well-known scalping incidents during this 
armed conflict, including the scalping of  the famous Sioux leader, 
Little Crow.27 During the Dakota War, the state of  Minnesota 
institutionalized a bounty system to encourage scalping of  Native 
Americans. For instance, the Annual Report of  the Adjutant General 
for 1863, an account of  military activity in Minnesota during the 
previous year, disclosed that on August 7, 1862, a bounty of  
$75.00 (approximately $1800 in 2016 dollars) was paid to W.M. 
Allen for killing a single Sioux warrior, while on August 31, 
Julius Schmidt received a bounty of  $5.00 (approximately $120 
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in 2016 dollars) for tanning a native’s scalp.28 This state sanction 
of  indiscriminate violence, coupled with a financial incentive, 
largely normalized the practice of  scalping among white troops. 
In his account of  the Battle of  New Ulm (August 1862), Colonel 
Charles Eugene Flandreau, the leading American commander in 
the engagement, described how without any trepidation “a half  
breed named Le Blanc lay in the grass as our men advanced, and 
fired and wounded one of  them…[so] a bullet sped after him, 
and cut the great artery on the shoulder…[Le Blanc] was soon 
finished, his head cut off  and scalped.”29 As whites, rather than 
natives, were the primary scalpers of  the Dakota War, the kind 
“Indian Outrages in The North-west—An American Family Murdered by 
the Sioux Indians, in a Grove Near New Elm, Minnesota—From a Sketch by 
a Correspondent.”
This cartoon was based on exaggerated reports of  Native American 
“atrocities” committed in the Minnesota frontier. This kind of  hyperbolic 
depiction of  violence stimulated northern anxiety, fueling the rhetoric of  
Confederate-Indian convergence in northern media outlets during 
the Dakota War.
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of  stereotypical Native American violence that the Confederates 
supposedly encouraged at Pea Ridge was conspicuously absent, 
belying the rumors that the Sioux Uprising was a Confederate 
orchestrated plot. 
 Yet, despite their own use of  scalping (among 
other atrocities), northern whites often vilified scalping as a 
sanguineous and treacherous indigenous practice. Following 
the Battle of  Fort Abercrombie (September 1862), white settler 
Edgar Wright was found mutilated as his body was “ripped up 
from the navel to the throat. The heart and liver taken out. The 
lungs left on the chest, the head cut off  scalped and struck in 
the cavity of  the abdomen with the face toward the feet.”30 
Additionally, Private William Schultz was found nearby, “with 
his skull smashed in, and his brains scattered about.”31 But, 
upon further review, white troops had committed similar actions 
earlier at New Ulm and Wood Lake (September 1862). Still, these 
atrocities were not acknowledged, as evidenced by the St. Cloud 
Democrat: the newspaper denounced these acts as uniquely the 
work of  indigenous “savages” and “demons” who sought to use 
“their most diabolical and ingenious devices of  cruelty” against 
innocent settlers.32
 While this hypocrisy was certainly racially motivated, 
it was also a conscious choice to rationalize the expulsion and 
mass annihilation of  the Sioux. Accounts of  scalping during 
the Dakota War emphasized the innocence of  white victims 
compared to the wickedness of  Sioux savagery. The St. Cloud 
Democrat claimed that those scalped at Fort Abercrombie were 
“void of  offense toward their foe, men of  unblemished reputation 
against whom the Indians could have had no memory of  wrongs 
to be revenged.” The newspaper celebrated Wright for being a 
man with a “high sense of  honor and strict integrity” who had 
kindly befriended the Sioux before they cruelly betrayed him. 
Minnesota newspapers used the sensationalized accounts of  these 
atrocities to support the conclusion that the Native Americans 
were malevolent “Hell Hounds” who had to be “swept from 
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the face of  the Earth, old and young, male and female.”33 This 
kind of  genocidal anti-native rhetoric remained common in the 
aftermath of  the Sioux Uprising, as evidenced by renown social 
reformer Harriet E. Bishop, who recalled gory descriptions of  
violent atrocities committed by the indigenous population and 
called these acts necessary to ensure that “Indian sympathizers 
may see the diabolical natures of  the foe our State has had to 
meet. We think it a mock philanthropy which would screen these 
guilty, unprovoked wretched from merited justice.”34 Evidently, 
scalping, while ironically more commonly used by white soldiers 
than Native Americans, emerged as a powerful symbol through 
which Minnesotans encouraged and rationalized the elimination 
of  the Sioux.
 When news of  these atrocities reached anxious Union 
audiences in the East, the northern readers were horrified. 
However, rather than simply demonize the natives like their 
counterparts in St. Cloud, presses in New York quickly co-opted 
the rhetoric established in reactions to Pea Ridge to describe 
the atrocities of  the Dakota War. The resulting escalation of  
the fictitious rumors of  a Confederate plot in Minnesota in 
Union magazines and newspapers reveals the extent to which 
northern audiences understood the Dakota War through the lens 
of  the Civil War. This can be seen in an infamous cartoon of  
the Sioux Uprising published by the New York based Harper’s 
Weekly magazine on September 13, 1862. Published ten days 
before the decisive defeat of  Chief  Little Crow and the Sioux 
forces at the Battle of  Wood Lake, which ended the conflict’s 
main military phase, the cartoon supported the ongoing rumors 
that the Dakota War, and the “savagery” practiced by the Sioux, 
was the product of  a Confederate plot. 
 The image, and its accompanying caption, directly 
connected the Sioux Uprising to a Confederate plot through the 
long-standing tropes of  Indian war that had been recently revived 
through the press following reactions to the Battle of  Pea Ridge. 
The natives depicted in the image resemble the “subhuman 
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and wanton brutes” that Browne in the New-York Tribune had 
described as fighters for the Confederacy at Pea Ridge: “the 
appearance of  some of  the besotted savages was fearful. They 
lost their sense of  caution and fear, and ran with long knives 
against large odds…with bloody hands and garments…with 
glittering eyes and horrid scowls, they raged about the field with 
terrible yells.”35 In fact, even though Browne’s article and the 
cartoon in Harper’s Weekly depicted the scalping of  two distinct 
defenseless groups—Browne detailed the scalping of  wounded 
soldiers at Pea Ridge, while the the cartoon centered on the 
scalping of  women and infants—it is worth noting that since the 
Colonial Period, wounded soldiers and women were regarded 
“I am happy to inform you that, in spite both of  blandishments and threats, 
used in profusion by the agents of  the government of  the United States, the 
Indian nations within the confederacy have remained firm in their loyalty and 
steadfast in the observance of  their treaty.
(The above Extract from JEFF DAVIS’S last Message will serve to explain 
the News from Minnesota.)”
The scalping scene depicted here does not resemble most accounts of  Native 
American violence reported from the Minnesota Front, and, most likely, was 
the product of  the artist’s preconceived stereotypes of  “Indian war.”
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as the typical victims of  savage physical mutilation. Far from an 
accurate portrayal of  the violence of  the Dakota War, however, 
the Harper’s Weekly image, like the Browne’s fraudulent account 
of  the Battle of  Pea Ridge, was a reflection of  how Americans 
had reimagined the horrors of  Indian war during the Civil War.
 While the fear of  Indian war had long been a part of  the 
American psyche, its renewed effectiveness stemmed from its 
ability to indianize, and thereby demonize, Confederate rebels. 
The New-York Tribune described the natives’ behavior at Pea 
Ridge as unremarkable, with the savages having only “repeated 
the outrages upon civilized warfare and the shocking barbarities 
with which our early history has made us familiar.”36 Similarly, 
the fact that the Sioux were scalping women and children in the 
Harper’s Weekly image was merely what most American’s had 
come to expect based on stereotypes of  Indian war. Moreover, 
the caption of  the Harper’s Weekly cartoon implied that through 
scalping, the Sioux “have remained firm in their loyalty and 
steadfast in the observance of  their treaty engagements with 
[the Confederacy].” The presence of  a liquor jug labeled “Agent 
C.S.A. [Confederate States of  America]” lying directly behind 
the violent scene reinforced the notion that the Confederacy 
encouraged these acts of  savage violence. Upon further review, 
the presence of  alcohol in both the denouncement of  Pike in 
the New-York Tribune and the cartoon in Harper’s Weekly opens 
up a series of  potential interpretations. It may be a reference to 
the long-standing stereotype of  alcoholism among indigenous 
communities. Alternatively, or perhaps, additionally, the 
presence of  alcohol in these depictions may seek to connect the 
Confederates to encouraging alcohol use and moral degeneration.
CONNECTING THE DAKOTA WAR AND THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR THROUGH INDIANIZATION
 While there is little evidence of  Confederate involvement 
in the Dakota War, the connection drawn between the Confederacy 
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and the Sioux atrocities would have seemed natural to a northern 
audience recently exposed to the reports of  Native Americans 
scalping at Pea Ridge. The attempts to associate Indian “savagery” 
and Confederate political and military policies suggested that the 
horror of  Native American violence was principally a product 
of  Confederate machinations. The accuracy of  the accounts was 
secondary, present only to create a veneer of  authenticity. Union 
critiques of  scalping, whether at Pea Ridge or in Minnesota, were 
primarily a pretense to criticize the Confederacy for enabling and 
allying with Indian savagery. 
 The Civil War and the Dakota War, while often viewed 
by scholars in isolation, appeared intrinsically linked for Union 
citizens on the home front. Northern propagandists used the 
racial understandings that underpinned this rhetoric to portray 
Indian savagery as convergent with the interests and principles 
of  the Confederacy in both politics and military leadership. 
These sources of  anti-Confederate propaganda revived the 
racial rhetoric of  Indian war that had first emerged during the 
Colonial Period, and served as an outlet for northern anxiety in 
the face of  military defeat in the East and the prospect of  a joint 
Confederate-Indian front in the West. 
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